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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ALGORITHMS FOR ACHIEVING FAULT-TOLERANCE AND ENSURING
SECURITY IN CLOUD COMPUTING SYSTEMS
Security and fault tolerance are the two major areas in cloud computing systems that
need careful attention for its widespread deployment. Unlike supercomputers, cloud
clusters are mostly built on low cost, unreliable, commodity hardware. Therefore,
large-scale cloud systems often suffer from performance degradation, service outages,
and sometimes node and application failures. On the other hand, the multi-tenant
shared architecture, dynamism, heterogeneity, and openness of cloud computing make
it susceptible to various security threats and vulnerabilities. In this dissertation,
we analyze these problems and propose algorithms for achieving fault tolerance and
ensuring security in cloud computing systems.
First, we perform a failure characterization study on the Google cluster data
trace and find out the key attributes that cause a job or a task to fail. Based on
these findings, we propose a failure prediction model that takes resource usage data
of a job or a task and predicts its probability to fail or finish. Next, we design a
cloud scheduler by leveraging this failure prediction model. Our scheduler adjusts
its scheduling decisions dynamically relying on the predicted outcome. Experimental
evaluations indicate that, our scheduler reduces job failure rate, increases resource
utilization, maintains load balance, and decreases job completion time.

Second, we present two cloud storage schemes that simultaneously achieve confidentiality, integrity, availability, and storage efficiency. Our first scheme uses convergent encryption with perfect secret sharing method to secure data and encryption
keys. This scheme also supports both file level and block level deduplication. User
authentication, fine-grained access control, and integrity auditing are addressed using
a challenge-response protocol based on Merkle hash tree data structure. Our second
scheme is a slight variation of the first one, where we introduce some approaches to
overcome the limitations of convergent encryption. In this scheme, we use ciphertext
policy attribute-based access structure to simplify fine-grained access control and key
management. This scheme is resilient against side-channel attacks and overall the attack vectors are reduced than the first scheme. Simulation results indicate that, both
schemes are semantically secure and incur minor overhead compared to the existing
state-of-the-art techniques.

KEYWORDS: Cloud Computing, Security, Fault Tolerance, Failure Prediction,
Convergent Encryption.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Interest in cloud computing has gained lot of attention in the last few years due to
the advantages it provides such as flexibility and availability in provisioning computing resources at lower cost [6]. Cloud computing is an abstraction based on the idea
of pooling physical resources and presenting them as virtual resources. It is a novel
model for provisioning resources, staging applications, and platform-independent consumer access to services [128]. One of the widely used definition of cloud computing
is by NIST: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction“ [93].
In cloud computing, since users pay only for the services they use, organizations’
initial investment for adopting cloud is very low [24]. Organizations now have the
flexibility to acquire resources or services on demand. As a result, development initiatives are now at lower risk of missing the business targets [92]. In the last few
years, researchers have extensively studied various aspects of cloud computing including Resource Management [61, 91, 94, 95, 99, 107, 152, 162], Access Control [23, 59],
Security and Auditing [51, 76, 130, 137, 142, 145, 154], issues related to Cloud Federation [25, 42, 66]. The demand for cloud services is increasing at a rapid pace causing
cloud service providers to overcome their limitations by creating a robust architecture
to guarantee sustainable service [29]. Quality of Service (QoS) is another important
1

factor that needs to be met by a service provider under service level agreement [4].
By outsourcing IT services to third party providers, companies can focus more on
their core business [128].
Despite the ever-growing interest in cloud and the plethora of services offered at
a reasonable cost, cloud computing systems are susceptible to numerous threats and
vulnerabilities. Several surveys [4,24,64] and technical journal articles [135,167] published by industry experts indicate that security and privacy are the most prevailing
barriers that are delaying its large-scale adoption. In Berkeley view of cloud computing [6], the following ten obstacles have been identified to be hindering the widespread
deployment of cloud computing: 1) availability of service, 2) data lock-in, 3) data
confidentiality and auditability, 4) data transfer bottlenecks, 5) performance unpredictability, 6) scalable storage, 7) bugs in large distributed systems, 8) scaling quickly,
9) reputation fate sharing, and 10) software licensing. Besides these, the use of virtualization technology also introduces potential threats like hypervisor vulnerabilities,
virtual machine sprawl, virtual machine side channel attacks, etc. [100, 118, 166].

1.1

Background

According to the NIST definition of cloud computing [93], cloud model has five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. In the
following subsections, these features are discussed.
1.1.1

Essential Characteristics of a Cloud

On-demand Self-service: Computing services (e.g., server time, storage) are provisioned automatically to the consumers as per their needs.
Broad Network Access : Services are available over the network and can be accessed from heterogeneous platforms (e.g., laptops, cell phones, and PDA’s)
through standard mechanisms.
2

Resource Pooling: Service providers’ physical and virtual resources are dynamically allocated and de-allocated to the clients as per their need in a location
independent manner.
Rapid Elasticity Computing capabilities can be rapidly provisioned to quickly scale
out and rapidly released as well to quickly scale in.
Measured Service: Resource usage is monitored and measured, therefore, users pay
only for the services they use.
1.1.2

Cloud Service Delivery Models

Cloud service models are classified into three main categories: Software as a Service
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
SaaS: SaaS applications are intended for end-users, delivered over the web, and can
be accessible from various client devices through a web browser. SaaS application examples include email and collaboration, customer relationship management, healthcare-related solutions, and HR and financial management systems.
Popular SaaS offerings are, Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365, Saleforce, and
Workday.
PaaS: PaaS model provides tools and services for customers to develop new applications and deploy them fast and efficiently. Google App Engine, Amazon’s
AWS Elastic Beanstalk, and Microsoft Azure are the notable examples of PaaS
solutions.
IaaS: IaaS model provides all the hardware and software necessary to provision processing, storage, network, and other fundamental computing resources. The
most widely used IaaS solutions include Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), and Google Compute
Engine (GCE).
3

1.1.3

Cloud Deployment Models

Cloud deployment models are divided mainly into: public, private, community, and
hybrid. Public Cloud is available publicly and anyone can subscribe for service to the
cloud. Private Cloud, on the other hand, is designed for exclusive use and is accessible
only within a private network. Community Cloud is owned, managed, and operated
by a well-defined number of parties that have shared concerns. Finally, Hybrid Cloud
is a blend of two or more cloud infrastructures (i.e., private, community, and public),
each of them remain as unique entities, but are bound together by standardized
technology.

1.1.4

Key Drivers for Adopting Cloud

Cloud computing has become one of the fastest growing paradigms of modern computing world because of the exciting services it offers at a low cost. Following is a list
of compelling reasons [92, 128] to move towards cloud computing.
Low Initial Investment: Since users pay for the service they use, initial investment
of organizations for adopting cloud is low.
Economies of Scale: Organizations have the flexibility to acquire resources or services on demand, which means the development initiatives are less at risk of
missing targets and dealing with the unknowns.
Open Standards: Cloud solutions are generally based on open source software that
allows users to use, change, and contribute on improving the quality of the
software.
Sustainability: Cloud service providers are constantly investing large amount of
money to create a robust and secure architecture. This encourages small organizations to rely on them for a sustainable service.
4

Quality of Service: Customers can be assured of Quality of Service (QoS) by signing appropriate service level agreement.
Reliability: Highly scalable networks, load balancing capabilities, and the ability to
provide failover make cloud computing service highly reliable.
Outsourced IT Management: By outsourcing the IT services to third party providers,
companies can focus more on their core business.

1.1.5

Challenges for Adopting Cloud

Researchers [52, 55, 65, 101, 128] are constantly trying to identify security and privacy
loop holes in cloud computing. They analyzed the existing security challenges at different levels (i.e., Network, Host, and Application level) and grouped them according
to different categories such as cloud infrastructure, service delivery models, and cloud
stake-holder related issues. Following list summarizes the challenges and obstacles
for widespread adoption of cloud computing.
Data Security and Privacy: Due to the shared multitenant architecture, protecting the security and privacy of customer data is one of the biggest challenges in
cloud environments.
Monitoring: Since all the operational controls are transferred to the Cloud vendor,
it may not be possible to deploy customized monitoring system for any specific
organization.
Network Bottlenecks: Network bottlenecks may occur in cloud computing when
large volume of data are transferred.
Service Level Agreements (SLAs): Satisfying SLA in cloud is a challenging task,
and sometimes negotiating with the large cloud providers can be difficult for
small companies.
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Storage: Large data stores are possible in cloud but because of the low bandwidth
and network bottlenecks, high speed queries cannot be executed as fast as it
could locally.
Vendor Lock-in: Dependency on a specific provider makes it difficult to migrate
services to other providers.
Compliance: Since laws and regulations vary depending on the geographical locations, it is a tough task for the cloud service providers to accommodate multiple
compliance regimes.

1.2

Security in the Cloud

In cloud computing systems, data and storage are outsourced to third party service
providers, and therefore, users lose direct control over data and storage management.
Moreover, cloud service providers that store clients’ data are not necessarily trustworthy and dependable. Hence, the key challenge is how to frequently, efficiently, and
securely verify that a storage server is trustworthily storing its client’s data. Although
cloud computing is an economically beneficial technology, a wide range of issues related to data and storage security still remains to be addressed and solved. Lack
of strong assurance on data confidentiality, integrity, and availability is hindering its
large-scale adoption. Researchers have been working on addressing and solving these
issues over the past few years. In this subsection, we classify and characterize the various security issues related to data and storage in cloud computing and do a critical
comparison of the solutions presented for these issues in the literature. Our analysis
and comparison not only identifies the merits and demerits of the solutions presented
in the literature but also reveals some open issues that need to be addressed.
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1.2.1

Secure and Efficient Access Control

Providing secure and efficient access to large-scale outsourced data is an important
requirement in cloud computing systems [160], and this remains one of the greatest
challenges the IT industry is facing today [2]. For most organizations, ensuring data
security and privacy are key necessities. So, a robust and effective access control
mechanism is a prerequisite for strategic use of on-demand cloud computing services.
One of the most critical challenges in this area is to manage access control matrices
for diverse user groups accessing the outsourced data. Organizations are constantly
challenged to rapidly provision appropriate access to the users whose roles and responsibilities often change for business reasons [92]. As a result, sustaining access
control policies can turn into a persistent challenge. Therefore, thwarting unauthorized access to data resources in the cloud deserves a major attention.
Wang et al. [151] presented a secure access control mechanism in owner-writeusers-read applications. In this scheme, every data block is encrypted with a different
key so that cryptography-based access control can be achieved. Through the adoption
of key derivation methods, the owner needs to maintain only a few secrets. The key
derivation procedure using hash functions introduces limited computation overhead.
Furthermore, to prevent revoked users from getting access to updated data blocks,
two methods named, over-encryption and lazy revocation are presented. Mechanisms
to handle both updates to outsourced data and changes in user access rights are also
considered.
A decentralized access control scheme for secure data storage in clouds that supports anonymous authentication has been presented by Ruj et al. [120]. In this
scheme, the cloud verifies the authenticity of the users without knowing the users’
identity before storing data. The scheme also has the added feature of access control in
which only valid users are able to decrypt the stored information. It prevents replay
attacks and supports creation, modification, and reading data stored in the cloud.
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User revocation issue has been addressed also. Moreover, this authentication and
access control scheme is decentralized and robust, unlike other access control schemes
designed for clouds, which are centralized. The communication, computation, and
storage overheads are comparable to centralized approaches.
Placing critical data in the hands of a cloud provider should come with the guarantee of security and availability for data at rest, in motion, and in use. Several
alternatives exist for storage services, while data confidentiality solutions for the
database as a service paradigm are still immature. Ferretti et al. [43] presented a
novel architecture that integrates cloud database services with data confidentiality
and the possibility of executing concurrent operations on encrypted data. This is
the first solution supporting geographically distributed clients to connect directly to
an encrypted cloud database, and to execute concurrent and independent operations
including those modifying the database structure. This architecture has the further
advantage of eliminating intermediate proxies that limit the elasticity, availability,
and scalability properties that are intrinsic in cloud-based solutions.
Storage outsourcing has become a rising trend nowadays to reduce data management costs. However, we must provide security guarantees for the outsourced data,
which are maintained by third parties. Tang et al. [158] designed and implemented
FADE, a secure overlay cloud storage system that achieves fine-grained, policy-based
access control and file assured deletion. It associates outsourced files with file access
policies, and assuredly deletes files to make them unrecoverable to anyone upon revocations of file access policies. To achieve such security goals, FADE is built upon
a set of cryptographic key operations that are self-maintained by a quorum of key
managers that are independent of third-party clouds. In particular, FADE acts as an
overlay system that works seamlessly atop today’s cloud storage services.
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1.2.2

Remote Data Integrity

Data Integrity in cloud computing is considered one of the biggest concerns. Integrity means information is accurate and reliable and has not been subtly altered
or tampered by an unauthorized party. The term integrity in fact is associated with
authenticity: the ability to verify that content has not been changed in an unlawful
manner; and non-repudiation and accountability: the source of any action performed
on the system can be verified and associated with the user who performed it. In addition to ensuring the integrity of the data, cloud consumers need to worry about the
confidentiality of the data also. To ensure confidentiality, use of any strong encryption
method alone is sufficient while integrity requires the use of message authentication
codes (MACs) [92].
Zeng [163] presented a pairing-based provable data integrity (PDI) scheme that
enables not only the customer but also a third party verifier to check the integrity of
data stored in cloud. This PDI scheme comprises of three steps: i) key generation,
ii) fingerprinting, and iii) challenge-response. First, a client’s public and private keys
are initialized by invoking a key generation algorithm. The client then publishes her
public key. Second, a client in possession of a file generates fingerprints of the file and
stores both the fingerprints and the file on the server. Then the client deletes both
the file content and fingerprints from its local storage. Third, a third party verifier
or the client himself can verify the integrity of the data by challenging the server.
The server responds with a data integrity proof. This challenge-response phase can
be executed an unlimited number of times. It is to be noted that the verifier does
not need a copy of the data or fingerprints to check integrity. The size of the public
key, fingerprints, challenge, and data integrity proof are reasonable. The cost of
computing the fingerprints is also nominal. This scheme is proven to be provably
secure and data format independent. Nevertheless, it has some limitations: it cannot
fingerprint a data file incrementally. It prohibits a data file to be modified in any
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form once the file has been fingerprinted.
Ateniese et al. [9] developed a Scalable Provable Data Possession (SPDP) technique based entirely on symmetric key cryptography, which does not require any bulk
encryption. This scheme has two main phases: i) setup phase, and ii) verification
phase. During setup phase, client or the owner of data generates in advance a certain number of random challenges and their corresponding answers. These answers
are denoted as tokens, where each token covers some subset of data blocks. After
all tokens are computed by client, she outsources the entire set to the server, along
with the data file. In the verification phase, client challenges the server with a set of
random-looking block indices. In turn, server must compute a short integrity check
(e.g., signature) over the specified blocks and return it to the client. For the proof to
hold, the returned integrity check must match the corresponding value pre-computed
by client. This technique supports operations such as block modification, deletion
and append on data files. But the number of updates and challenges a client can
perform is limited and fixed a priori since the owner of the data generates in advance
a static number of random challenges with the corresponding answers as metadata.
Another limitation is, only append-type insertions are possible in this scheme, block
insertions in random location cannot be performed. Additionally, update operations
need recreating all the remaining challenges which is not computationally feasible for
large files.
An extension of the PDP model to support provable updates on the stored data,
called Dynamic Provable Data Possession (DPDP) scheme, is presented by Erway et
al. [38]. This solution is based on a new variant of authenticated dictionaries built
over a skip list, where rank information is used to organize the dictionary entries.
Thus, efficient authenticated operations on files at the block level, such as insertion
and deletion can be supported. The update operation in this model describes the
most typical form of modification a client may wish to perform on a file. DPDP is
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a provable storage system that facilitates efficient proofs of a whole file. It enables
verification process at different levels for different users (e.g., every user can verify her
own home directory), while not requiring the whole file to be downloaded. The server
computation, client computation, and communication have logarithmic complexity.
The probability of detecting server misbehavior is also same as the original PDP
scheme. However, since this scheme imposes heavy computation overhead on the
client side, it might not be feasible in practical implementation.
Cong et al. [146] addressed data security and fault tolerance issues in distributed
cloud storage. To survive multiple failures in a distributed storage system, it uses
Reed-Solomon [112] erasure-correcting code, where a data file F is dispersed redundantly across a set of n = m + k distributed servers. Here, k redundancy parity
vectors are created from m data vectors in such a way that the original m data vectors can be reconstructed from any m out of the m + k data and parity vectors.
By placing each of the m + k vectors on a different server, the original data file
can survive failure of any k of the m + k servers without any data loss. Similar
to the challenge-response system of SPDP scheme discussed above, this scheme uses
some pre-computed verification tokens to prove data integrity. Furthermore, it incorporates error localization method into its challenge-response system. Thus, once
storage inconsistency is detected, with the help of the pre-computed verification tokens, this scheme determines the location of the potential data error, and thereby
identifies misbehaving servers. This scheme supports secure and efficient dynamic
operations on data blocks, including: update, delete and append. It enhances data
availability in the presence of Byzantine failures, malicious data modification and
server colluding attacks, thus reducing the effect of data errors or server failures.
This approach reduces the communication and storage overhead compared to the
traditional replication-based file distribution techniques. However, considering the
time, computation resources, it is not easy for users to perform the integrity checking
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tasks by themselves.

1.2.3

Secure Data Sharing

Due to its data and resource-sharing nature, cloud-based services are an attractive
model for applications like online word processing, calendaring, blogging, and social
networking. These applications allow multiple users to edit their shared resources
concurrently, while being scalable, highly available and globally accessible [40]. These
benefits on the contrary can affect privacy due to server-side information leakage and
pose significant risk to the confidentiality of those shared resources [30]. Allowing
users to store data in the cloud alone is not adequate; it might also be essential
to guarantee anonymity. But, ensuring unrestricted anonymity can help a defied
employee of an organization mislead others by sharing malicious files without being
traceable [120]. Lastly, recurrent change in group membership makes it difficult to
share data in a multi-owner environment while preserving data integrity and privacy
at the same time [85].
Several schemes [30, 40, 67, 85, 88, 161] addressing the security issues related to
data sharing on unreliable servers have been proposed. Kallahalla et al. [67] presented a cryptographic storage system, named Plutus, that enables secure file sharing
on untrusted servers. By dividing files into file-groups and encrypting each file-group
with a unique file-block key, the data owner can share the file-groups with others
through delivering the corresponding lockbox key, where the lockbox key is used to
encrypt the file-block keys. However, it results in heavy key distribution overhead
for large-scale file sharing. Additionally, the file-block key needs to be updated and
redistributed for every user revocation. In summary, the complexity of user participation and revocation in this scheme increases linearly with the increase of data owners
and the number of revoked users. To mitigate this issue, Lu et al. [88] presented a
secure provenance scheme, which is built upon group signatures and ciphertext-policy
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attribute-based encryption techniques. Particularly, the system in their scheme is set
with a single attribute. Each user obtains two keys after the registration: a group
signature key and an attribute key. Thus, any user is able to encrypt a data file using
attribute-based encryption and others in the group can decrypt the encrypted data
using their attribute keys. The user signs encrypted data with her group signature
key for privacy preserving and traceability. However, user revocation is not supported
in their scheme.
Chu et al. [30] presented a public-key encryption system (i.e., key-aggregate cryptosystem (KAC)), which supports flexible delegation of decryption rights so that any
subset of ciphertexts is decryptable by a constant-size decryption key. Under KAC,
users encrypt a message not only with a public-key, but also with an identifier of
ciphertext, called class. That means the ciphertexts are further labeled into different
classes. The key owner holds the master-secret called master-secret key, which can
be used to extract secret keys for different classes. More importantly, the extracted
key can be an aggregate key that is as compact as a secret key for a single class, but
aggregates the power of many such keys, i.e., the decryption power for any subset of
ciphertext classes. In other words, the secret key holder can release a constant-size
aggregate key for flexible choices of ciphertext set in cloud storage, but the other
encrypted files outside the set remain confidential. The sizes of ciphertext, publickey, master-secret key, and aggregate key in KAC scheme are all of constant size. In
this scheme, they mainly consider how to compress secret keys in public-key cryptosystems, which support delegation of secret keys for different ciphertext classes in
cloud storage. No matter which one among the power set of classes, the delegatee
can always get an aggregate key of constant size. This approach is more flexible
than hierarchical key assignment, which can only save spaces if all key-holders share
a similar set of privileges. A limitation of this work is the predefined bound on the
number of maximum ciphertext classes. In cloud storage, the number of ciphertexts
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usually grows rapidly. Hence, enough ciphertext classes for the future extension have
to be reserved a priori.
In most of the schemes discussed above, data owners store the encrypted data files
in untrusted storage and then distribute the corresponding decryption keys only to
authorized users. Clearly, this single-owner scheme is not flexible in practical applications compared to multi-owner scheme, where each user in the group not only reads
data, but also modifies her part of the data in the entire data file shared. Liu et al. [85]
addressed this issue by presenting a secure multi-owner data-sharing scheme, named
Mona, for dynamic groups in the untrusted cloud. By leveraging group signature [19]
and broadcast encryption [44] techniques, any cloud user can anonymously share data
with others. Group signature allows any member of the group to sign messages while
keeping the identity secret from verifiers. However, once disputes occur, the group
manager can reveal the real identities of data owners . On the other hand, broadcast encryption enables a broadcaster to transmit encrypted data to a set of users so
that only a privileged subset of users can decrypt the data. Additionally, it allows
the group manager to dynamically include new members while preserving previously
computed information (i.e., user decryption keys, group encryption key etc.). User
revocation is supported in this scheme without involving the remaining users. That
is, the remaining users need not update their private keys. The size and computation overhead of encryption are constant and independent of the number of revoked
users. This scheme is capable of supporting access control, data confidentiality, and
anonymity. A disadvantage of ensuring anonymity of users is it can help a malicious
insider launch an attack without being traced.

1.2.4

Data Dynamics and Auditability

Ensuring data integrity in cloud computing environment is a difficult task, especially
when data are frequently updated by the clients through block modification, inser14

tion, and deletion. Most of the existing works on remote integrity checking focus
on static archival data and therefore cannot be used if dynamic data updates are
more common [156]. Furthermore, direct extension of the Provable Data Possession
(PDP) [8] or Proof of Retrievability (PoR) [21] techniques that can support data
dynamics may lead to security loopholes [148]. Therefore, an efficient and provably
secure dynamic auditing protocol is highly desirable in cloud environment to verify
the integrity of data. Another challenging task is to efficiently handle user revocation in a shared-data environment while performing public auditing. Different data
blocks could have been modified and signed by different users. Therefore, whenever
a user updates a block, she needs to re-sign the modified block by computing a new
signature for that block. Once a user in a group leaves or found to be misbehaving,
she must be revoked from the group and the blocks that were previously signed by
her will have to be checked and re-signed by an existing user in the group so that
the integrity of the entire data can still be ensured. One approach to recompute
these signatures is to allow an existing user to download the corresponding blocks
of shared data, verify the integrity of these blocks, and re-sign these blocks. This
method is inefficient, especially when the number of re-signed blocks is large or the
group membership changes frequently.
The issue of providing support for public auditability while the data are being
modified concurrently has not been fully studied. Wang et al. [148, 149] explored
this problem. To support dynamic data modification, they use classic Merkle Hash
Tree [138] construction for block tag authentication. Moreover, the technique of
bilinear aggregate signature [20] is incorporated to facilitate multiple auditing tasks
for the third party auditor. But there remains a possibility of corrupting data by
the auditor since it requires the server to send a linear combination of data blocks
to auditor. With the help of these data blocks and their corresponding signatures,
an auditor can generate new signatures and can tamper data. Yang et al. [156] also
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addressed the dynamic auditing issue. They propose a protocol that protects the
data privacy against the auditor by combining the cryptography method with the
bilinearity property of bilinear pairing. Batch auditing for multiple owners can be
performed in this scheme. Moreover, this approach incurs less communication and
computation cost on the auditor since the computing overhead is moved from the
auditor to the server. Thus, the auditing performance improves to a great extent and
therefore it can be applied to large-scale cloud storage systems.
Designing an efficient audit scheme to verify the integrity of shared data while
preserving the anonymity of the user is another challenging task in cloud environment.
To address this issue, Wang et al. [143] presented a privacy-preserving mechanism,
named Knox, to audit data that is stored in a cloud and shared among a large group
of users. By combining group signatures [138] and homomorphic authenticators [49],
they construct a homomorphic authenticable group signature (HAGS) scheme. Group
signatures provide anonymity of signers, who belong to the same group. On the other
hand, homomorphic authenticators ensure block-less verification that allow a TPA to
check the correctness of data with a linear combination of some selected set of blocks,
while the entire data does not need to be downloaded. Furthermore, it prevents a
TPA from generating new fake signatures by combining existing signatures. Knox
is scalable— even if the number of users in the group increases, it does not affect
the time it takes to perform auditing. The initial user (i.e., the group manager) who
creates and shares the data can trace group signatures, and reveal the identities of
signers when it is required. The main drawback of Knox is that, it does not support
public auditing— it allows an authorized TPA to share a secret key pair with users.
However, TPA still cannot compute valid group signatures like a group user because
this secret key pair is only a part of a group user’s private key.
The issue of handling user revocation while conducting public auditing in cloud
has been addressed by Wang et al. [144]. They present a public auditing mechanism
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named Panda, which takes advantage of a novel proxy re-signature scheme. Proxy
re-signature scheme [133] allows a semi-trusted proxy (e.g., the cloud) to act as a
translator of signatures between two users. That means, the proxy is able to convert
a signature of one user into a signature of another user on the same block. Therefore,
once a user in a group is revoked, the cloud who acts as the semi-trusted proxy, can
re-sign the blocks (on behalf of an existing user), which were previously signed by the
revoked user. Thus, the efficiency of user revocation can be significantly improved,
and computation and communication resources of existing users can be optimized.
However, the cloud is not able to extract any information regarding the private keys of
the two users, which means, it cannot sign any arbitrary block on behalf of either the
revoked user or an existing user. Panda is scalable, which indicates it is not only able
to efficiently support a large number of users to share data but also able to handle
multiple auditing tasks simultaneously with batch auditing. The main drawback of
this scheme is that, the proxy re-signature scheme is not collision-resistant. Hence,
if a revoked user is able to collude with the cloud, who possesses a re-signing key,
then the cloud and the revoked user together are able to reveal the private key of an
existing user.

1.2.5

Secure Data Backup and Assured Deletion

Outsourcing data to the cloud does not necessarily mean that data are actually backed
up. Data could be lost accidentally or modified by adversaries. If the original copy
of the data is not properly backed up, recovery would be impossible. To avoid data
loss and maintain business continuity, consumers must ensure that proper backup
policies are in place. Because of the ease of operations, service providers may prefer
to rely on seamless backups without the active consent of the clients [101]. This
approach is undesirable since data can be unexpectedly disclosed in future due to
some external or internal attacks on the cloud or erroneous management by the cloud
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operators [136]. Controlling the version of the backups is also challenging since data
could be replicated multiple times by the service provider over the infrastructure [111].
Another critical issue in cloud computing is to ensure assured deletion, i.e., ensuring
data files are permanently inaccessible upon deletion. It is a process of expunging
data from the storage media so that data cannot be reconstructed later. In today’s
cloud environment, data from one customer is physically collocated (e.g., in IaaS) or
commingled (e.g., in SaaS) with the data of other customers, which can have serious
security implications [64].
Several approaches [48, 111, 136] have been proposed to address the above two
issues. Vanish [48] is one such system that focuses on increasing data privacy with
self-destructing data. Vanish tries to ensure that all copies of data become inaccessible
after a user-specified time period, without any explicit action by the users or any
party storing or archiving that data. To implement this, Vanish encrypts a user’s
data with a random data key. It then uses threshold secret sharing [127] to split the
data key into N pieces, where the threshold determines the number of shares required
to reconstruct the original key. After that, it employs a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator to derive N indices (for N nodes) into a public P2P
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and sprinkles the N key shares at these pseudorandom
locations throughout the DHT. Nodes remove the key shares that reside in their
caches after a fixed time period. Once less than threshold number of key shares are
available, data become permanently inaccessible. If a file needs to remain accessible
after that time period, the file owner needs to update the key shares in node caches.
Although Vanish meets the privacy-preserving goal, it has some limitations. Firstly,
the fixed data timeout and large replication factor of existing DHTs present challenges
for a self-destructing data system, therefore, are not always suitable for Vanish-like
applications. Secondly, Vanish performs assured deletion based upon time expiration,
but do not consider fine-grained deletion that honors file access policies.
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Vrable et al. [140] present a cloud-based backup system, called Cumulus, designed
around a minimal interface which supports only put, get, delete, and list operations on
files. These operations work on an entire file as opposed to arbitrary ranges of bytes
in a file. Cumulus implements a write-once storage model, in which a file is never
modified after it is uploaded to the server, except to delete it when space recovery is
necessary. Cumulus keeps snapshots (i.e., metadata log and file data) of the system at
multiple points. When storing a snapshot, it often groups data from many smaller files
together into larger units called segments. Segments become the unit of storage on the
server, with each segment stored as a single file. If only a small portion of a large file
changes between snapshots, only the changed portion of the file is stored. The content
of each file is specified as a list of objects, so new snapshots can continue to point
to old objects when data is unchanged. Usage of segments by aggregating smaller
files results in lesser communication and metadata storage overhead. Aggregation
also helps in encrypting the file that is being sent across the network. In write-once
model, since files are never modified, a failed backup run cannot corrupt old snapshots
in Cumulus. At worst, it leaves a partially-written snapshot which can be garbagecollected later. Partial restoration of data from backup might also be very inefficient
in Cumulus since it downloads multiple segments from the server. Cumulus is more
suited to write-once-read-many times systems as it does not support modification of
files. Overhead associated with storing snapshots will also increase if updates are very
frequent. Cumulus supports version control and archives different versions of backups,
however, it does not provide assured deletion. The delete operation in Cumulus only
requests the cloud to remove the physical copy of a file, but there is no guarantee
that the file is assuredly deleted.
Tang et al. [158] designed and implemented FADE, a secure overlay cloud storage system that not only achieves fine-grained, policy-based access control but also
makes sure that files are properly deleted. FADE generalizes the time-based file as19

sured deletion (e.g., Vanish) to a more fine-grained approach called policy-based file
assured deletion, in which data files are assuredly deleted when the associated file
access policies are revoked and become obsolete. That means, even if a file that is
associated with revoked policies exists, it remains encrypted and the corresponding
cryptographic keys cannot be retrieved to recover the file. Thus, the file becomes
irrecoverable by anyone including the owner of the file. The design intuition behind
FADE is to decouple the management of encrypted data and cryptographic keys, such
that encrypted data remains on cloud storage providers, while cryptographic keys are
independently maintained and operated by a quorum of key managers that altogether
form a secure and trustworthy environment. To provide guarantees of access control and assured deletion, FADE leverages standard cryptographic schemes including
threshold secret sharing and attribute-based encryption (ABE). It also performs various cryptographic key operations that provide security for basic file upload/download
operations. The design of FADE is based on the thin-cloud interface similar to Cumulus, where it only requires the cloud to support basic data access operations such
as put and get. Thus, FADE is applicable for general types of storage backends, as
long as such backends provide the interface for uploading and downloading data. In
FADE, it is assumed that a key manager is subject to only fail-stop failures [27], and
the quorum scheme enables the key management to be robust against such failures.
However, they do not consider the case of arbitrary (or Byzantine) failures in key
managers (e.g., tampering with control keys or policies). Unlike Cumulus, FADE
does not support version control and cannot archive different versions of backups.
Existing version-controlled data backup systems (e.g., Cumulus) and assured deletion systems (e.g., Vanish, and FADE) are incompatible with each other. Rahumed
et al. [111] presented a secure cloud backup system named FadeVersion that enables
assured deletion for outsourced data backups on the cloud, while addressing the important features for a typical backup application. The goal is to make both version
20

control and assured deletion compatible with each other in a single design. One of
the key features of FadeVersion is to enable version control for outsourced data backups, so that cloud clients can roll-back to retrieve data from earlier versions. It has
similar ideas as in Cumulus, in which different data objects are created that are to
be archived on the cloud. On top of the version control design, a layered approach of
cryptographic protection is added, in which, data are encrypted with the first layer
of keys, called the data keys. The data keys are further encrypted with another layer
of keys, called the control keys. The control keys are defined by fine-grained policies
that specify how each file is accessed. If a policy is revoked, then its associated control
key is deleted. If the data object is associated solely with the revoked policy, then it
will be assuredly deleted. If the data object is associated with both the revoked policy
and another active policy, then the data object will still be allowed to be accessed
through the active policy. Since FadeVersion follows the standard version-controlled
backup design, it eliminates the storage of redundant data across different versions of
backups. Additionally, it allows fine-grained assured deletion, such that cloud clients
can specify particular versions or files on the cloud to be assuredly deleted, while
other versions that share the common data of the deleted versions or files will remain unaffected. It also applies cryptographic protection to data backups. The main
performance overhead is the additional storage required to store cryptographic keys
in data backups. Nevertheless, this additional overhead of FadeVersion is justifiable
compared to Cumulus, which does not possess the assured deletion functionality.

1.3

Fault-Tolerance in the Cloud

Although interest in cloud is rapidly increasing and a plethora of services are offered at a reasonable cost, cloud computing is susceptible to failures and performance
degradation. Quite a number of issues that can hamper reliability and availability
exist. In addition to service outages, large–scale storage systems can experience ap21

plication failures, disk or sector failures, and node failures; some of this can result
in permanent data loss. And with the exponential growth of archival data, a small
failure rate can imply significant data loss in archival storage [63].

1.3.1

Failure Analysis

Prior studies characterize failures in supercomputers and clouds from the perspective
of system failures [37, 139] and application failures [70, 116]. El-Sayed et al. [37]
perform a comprehensive statistical analysis on supercomputer logs from Los Alamos
National Labs, presented in the computer failure data repository (CFDR). They observed that some types of failures increase the likelihood of follow-up failures than
others. In particular, environmental failures (e.g., power outages, effect of temperature etc.) and network failures have a very strong effect on subsequent failures. These
observations are critical for creating effective failure prediction models, as they imply
that such models should not only account for correlations between failures in time
and space, but also consider the root causes of failures. Vishwanathan et al. [139]
explore the hardware reliability of clouds. They find that disks are the main reason
for node failures.
Using workload traces from The Grid Workload Archive project [62], Fadishei et
al. [39] find correlations between job failures and attributes including CPU intensity,
memory usage, CPU utilization, queue utilization, exit hour and migration of jobs.
Kavulya et al. [70] try to characterize the job patterns and their failure causes by
investigating the logs from Hadoop applications. Ren et al. [116] perform a similar
study with the logs collected from Hadoop clusters running e-commerce applications.

1.3.2

Workload Characterization

A number of researchers over the years have studied [35, 86, 113–115, 164] the Google
cluster dataset that focus on the workload characterization and machine utilization.
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Reiss et al. [114] perform an extensive study on the Google cluster traces and characterize the workload pattern of jobs and tasks. Liu et al. [86] perform a statistical
analysis of node, job and task level workload with respect to resource utilization. Reiss
et al. [113] study the heterogeneity of tasks in the Google dataset. They notice that
the resources utilized and the tasks executed vary widely. Khan et al’s. [72] workload
characterization can reproduce the performance of historical workload traces with
respect to key performance metrics, such as task wait time and machine resource
utilization. Zhang et al. [164] propose a model for runtime task resource usage that
is able to reproduce aggregate resource usage and scheduling delays. They find that
using the mean and coefficient of variation within each task can generate synthetic
workload traces, reproducing accurate resource utilization and task waiting time. Di
et al. [35] compare the differences between the Google data center and a Grid system.
They find that the Google dataset exhibits finer granularity resource allocation with
respect to CPU and memory than the selected Grid system.

1.3.3

Failure Prediction

Online failure prediction based on runtime monitoring is a popular research area.
There has been a variety of models and methods that use the current state of a
system and, frequently, past experience as well to predict system’s future output [123].
Fu et al. [46] present such an anomaly detection method which monitors the system
execution and collects runtime performance data, that are usually unlabeled in nature.
It is a self-evolving anomaly detection framework that integrates classification and
clustering approach. Different from other failure detection approaches, it does not
require any prior failure history and can self-adapt by recursively exploring newly
generated verified detection results for future anomaly identification.
Prior results on failure analysis or workload characterization have been applied
to failure diagnosis and prediction in supercomputers and cloud clusters [39, 80, 97,
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153]. Liang et al. [80] use tagged logs from the BlueGene machine to discover failure
recurrences. They discover that there is a strong correlation between fatal and nonfatal events. They use these findings to predict possible future failures. Pan et al. [97]
investigate the nodes in a MapReduce environment to identify failures. They observed
that faulty nodes behave differently than the normal nodes. They use these differences
in the behavior of nodes in a MapReduce environment to identify failures. However,
problems arise when nodes are heterogeneous or few similar nodes are considered as
references.

1.4

Problems Addressed and Solved in the Dissertation

In this dissertation, we classify our problem lists into two main domains, namely, i)
fault-tolerance, and ii) security in cloud computing systems. We first describe the
problems in each domain and then briefly present our solution approaches.

1.4.1

Fault-tolerance in Cloud

Large-scale cloud computing systems experience failures for many different reasons,
such as, the dynamics of runtime cloud states, heterogeneity of configurations, multitenant shared architectures, and unpredictable resource requirements, etc. If a node
in a cluster fails, it causes the jobs and tasks at that node to abort. In addition, applications may also experience out-of-memory exceptions and various software bugs.
Hence, it is important to understand and characterize the pattern of failures to design a reliable and fault-tolerant cloud. We studied the Google cluster trace in this
task and found that application-centric failure prediction and adaptive rescheduling
of jobs could be a feasible option for building a reliable cloud. Unfortunately, the
scarcity of real world data makes this task difficult. Our goal is to find answers to
the following research questions (RQ):
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RQ1: What are the key features or attributes that mainly contribute to task or job
failures in a production cloud?
RQ2: Can application failures (i.e., task and job failures) in a production cloud be
predicted accurately?
RQ3: What benefits can be achieved by employing a failure prediction model?
RQ4: Can application-centric failure prediction and adaptive rescheduling based on
the prediction be a viable option for building a fault-tolerant cloud?
We addressed the above mentioned problems in the fault-tolerance domain of
cloud computing and following are our major contributions in this direction.

Predicting Application Failure in Cloud
We addressed the first three research questions (RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3) in this subtask. First, we studied the Google trace data and tried to find out the key attributes
that mainly cause task and job failures. Our analysis also revealed that a substantial
amount of system resources (e.g., CPU, memory, and service time) are wasted due
to killed and failed jobs. Second, we presented a failure prediction model based on
a recurrent neural network. Our model takes resource usage data and predicts the
termination status of a task or a job. Third, we explored the potential of early failure
prediction with resubmission of jobs when they are “predicted to be failed”. This
proved useful as our simulation of a selected set of jobs demonstrate that, we can
save a good amount of resources in this case.

A Fault-tolerant Cloud Scheduler Using Recurrent Neural Network
We mainly addressed the research question four (RQ4) in this sub-task. We presented
a fault-tolerant cloud scheduler that first makes use of our failure prediction model and
then performs task rescheduling. In the rescheduling phase, our scheduler applies task
migration algorithm to find an appropriate node to transfer a task. The prototype
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implementation and simulation results indicate that, our proactive scheduler reduces
failure rate of tasks and their completion time. We also noticed that, early prediction
with a dynamic scheduling adjustments improves the overall resource utilization and
curtail resource wastage.

1.4.2

Security in Cloud Computing Systems

Conventional cryptosystems and secret sharing schemes on one hand ensure data
security and on the other hand allow duplicate data to be stored. Convergent encryption was introduced by researchers which can identify and remove duplicate data
from the server. Nevertheless, this scheme leaks private information by looking at
the deduplication operation and also vulnerable to various well known “side-channel
attacks”. Apart from these, a secure and reliable cloud storage must also ensure data
availability, secure authentication and fine-grained access control, and an efficient key
management process. Therefore, we made attempts to find answers to the following
research questions (RQ):
RQ5: Why “convergent encryption” has an extra edge over the conventional cryptosystems to achieve confidentiality and storage efficiency at the same time?
RQ6: How can we ensure secure authentication and integrity auditing in a cloud?
RQ7: What could be a secure and efficient solution to disperse data and encryption
keys to cloud?
RQ8: How “solutions with redundancy” may help in improving data availability and
reliability of a cloud?
RQ9: Can we combat the “side-channel attacks” associated with the “convergent encryption” and reduce attack vectors?
RQ10: How can we guarantee “fine-grained access control” and simplify “key management” process?
We addressed the above mentioned problems in the security domain of cloud
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computing and following are our major contributions in this direction.

A Secure and Reliable Cloud Storage Scheme Supporting Deduplication
We tried to solve research questions RQ5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8 in this sub-task. We
presented a cloud storage scheme that combines convergent encryption with perfect
secret sharing method which ensures confidentiality of data and encryption keys. Our
scheme supports both file and block level deduplication of data, and thus achieves
storage efficiency. Data availability is guaranteed by dispersing data to multiple
storage servers using erasure coding. Our scheme supports authentication and access
control using Merkle hash tree data structure. Merkle hash tree is also used to perform
data integrity checking using a Proof of Ownership challenge-response protocol.

An Efficient and Secure Cloud Storage Scheme Combining Convergent
Encryption and Access Control Structure
Our solution approaches focus mainly on the research questions RQ7, RQ9, and
RQ10 in this sub-task. It is a known fact that, convergent encryption suffers from
side-channel attacks. To combat these attacks, we presented a storage scheme that
blends convergent encryption with an access control structure for securing data and
encryption keys. Users whose attributes satisfy the access structure can only decrypt
the key and get the data. Thus this scheme ensures secure and fine-grained access
control on the outsourced data, and simplifies the key management process to a great
extent than the previous solution.

1.5

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of six chapters. The remainder of this dissertation is
organized as follows.
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• In Chapter 2, we present a thorough analysis of the Google cluster dataset and
then present our failure prediction model. We also explore the benefits of early
failure prediction.
• In Chapter 3, we present algorithms for our fault-tolerant cloud scheduler that
makes use of the failure prediction model with dynamic rescheduling.
• In Chapter 4, we present a cloud storage scheme that uses convergent encryption
with perfect sharing method for securing data and encryption keys. We also
present algorithms for data deduplication both at the file and block level.
• In Chapter 5, we present another storage scheme for cloud that blends convergent encryption with an attribute-based access structure. The idea is to
combat against possible side-channel attacks, impose more secured access control on data, and simplify key management process.
• We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6, with a discussion on some possible
future research directions in cloud computing security and fault-tolerance areas.
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Chapter 2

A Machine Learning Approach for Predicting Application Failure in
Cloud

Despite employing the architectures designed for high service reliability and availability, cloud computing systems do experience service outages and performance slowdown. In addition to these, large-scale cloud systems experience failures in their
hardware and software components which often result in node and application (e.g.,
jobs and tasks) failures. Therefore, to build a reliable cloud system, it is important
to understand and characterize the observed failures. The goal of this work is to
enhance the reliability of the cloud environment and applications running in there.
To accomplish this, we perform a failure characterization study based on Google cluster workload trace. Our analysis reveals that, there is a significant consumption of
resources due to failed and killed jobs. We further explore the potential for failure
prediction in cloud applications so that we can avoid the wastage of resources by better managing the jobs that ultimately fail or get killed. In this chapter, we present
a prediction method based on a special type of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
named Long Short-Term Memory Network (LSTM) to identify application failures
in cloud. It takes resource usage measurements or performance data for each job,
and the goal is to predict the termination status (e.g., failed, finished, etc.). Our
algorithm can predict task failures with 87% accuracy and achieves a true positive
rate of 85% and false positive rate of 11%.
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2.1

Introduction

Despite the ever-growing interest in cloud and the plethora of services offered at a reasonable cost, cloud computing is susceptible to failures and performance degradation.
Due to the complexity, dynamism and openness of cloud computing, applications
running on them are prone to failures which could affect a large number of customers
and could even lead to massive financial loss. And with the exponential growth of
archival data, a small failure rate can imply significant data loss in archival storage.
The tools available in current large-scale workflow engines for interactively looking at which nodes or applications failed are not sufficient to cope with serious failures, because by the time a significant pattern of failure is detected, large amount
of resources will have been wasted [124].The large-scale dynamic cloud computing
environment has raised great challenges for fault management. Since a dynamic deployment context causes application models to change over time, fault diagnosis must
adapt to the dynamic environment, especially dynamic and diverse workloads [150].
Furthermore, in virtualized environments, many levels of failures are hidden from the
application, and thus hard to monitor and analyze. Detailed system statistics can be
difficult or impossible to obtain [124]. Moreover, current commercial monitoring tools
(e.g., Amazon CloudWatch, IBM Tivoli and HP OpenView) typically require system
operators to manually set threshold for system metrics. When a metric exceeds the
pre-defined threshold, alerts are raised automatically. However, since hundreds of
applications are deployed in a large-scale network composed of thousands of nodes,
it is extremely difficult for the system administrators to manually model the applications by collecting so many metrics from many different layers [150]. Therefore,
fault management must have the ability to detect and prevent failure automatically
without any manual intervention.
Fault management in cloud computing research is in great need of statistical parameters derived from the data of real-world systems. It is important to understand
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and analyze the data for developing a cloud environment that is both available and
dependable; and creating such an environment is critical as well as a challenging research problem. Unfortunately, scarcity of the real-world cloud dataset makes the
problem even more challenging. Due to confidentiality reasons, a limited number of
large-scale datasets are available publicly. Moreover, even if datasets are available,
handling such a massive amount of data is also difficult— datasets usually approach
big-data size and involve processing complexities.
A limited number of existing work has attempted to characterize failures in supercomputers and clouds from the perspective of system failures [37,139] and application
failures [70, 116]. There have been a few studies [72, 86, 113] on the Google cluster
dataset focusing on the workload characterization and machine utilization. However,
application-centric failure detection and prediction in large-scale cloud environment
is still a least researched topic. Efficient and accurate failure detection in utility cloud
is challenging due to the dynamics of runtime cloud states, heterogeneity of configuration, non-linearity of failure occurrences, and overwhelming volume of performance
data in production environments. Recent work has developed various technologies
to tackle the problems of failure detection and failure management. They however
require failure history and fall short, in one area or the other, in terms of efficiency,
adaptability, and online dependability [98].
To build a reliable cloud system, it is important to understand and characterize
the observed failures. The goal of this work is to help enhance the reliability of the
cloud environment and applications running in there. To accomplish this, we perform
a failure characterization study of the Google cluster workload trace. Our analysis
reveals that, there is a significant wastage of resources due to failed and killed jobs.
We further explore the potential for failure prediction in cloud applications so that we
can avoid the wastage of resources by better managing the jobs that ultimately fail or
get killed. For this, we propose a failure prediction method based on a special type of
31

recurrent neural network named long short-term memory (LSTM) network to identify
application failures (i.e., job and task failures) in cloud. It takes resource usage
measurements or performance data for each job, and tries to predict the termination
status (e.g., failed, killed, finished, etc.).
Following are our major contributions in this direction:
• We perform a failure characterization study on the Google cluster workload
trace to understand the key characteristics of task/job failures in a production cloud. We investigate the relationship between resource consumption and
task/job failures to find out the relevant features or attributes that mainly cause
such failures.
• We present a failure prediction method based on a special type of recurrent
neural network called Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) network to detect
application failures (i.e., job and task failures) in cloud. Experimental results
show that our prediction system detects task failures and job failures with an
accuracy of 87% and 81% respectively.
• We simulate a selected set of jobs (long and medium multi-task batch jobs that
are predicted ‘to be failed’) in a distributed cloud simulator called GloudSim [34],
and integrate our prediction system to that. Our analysis reveals that, even if
we resubmit (i.e., kill and restart/resubmit) the ”predicted to be failed” jobs
up to a maximum number of times (e.g., 10 times), we end up saving 12-20%
of the resources (mean CPU, memory and service time) on average.
• We compare results using multiple machine learning models and find that our
system achieves the most stable performance in terms accuracy, precision, and
recall. Furthermore, we achieve a true positive rate 85% and a false positive
rate of only 11% at the task level.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We present some related work on
failure analysis and prediction in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we provide an overview
of the Google cluster dataset with a brief failure characterization study, and then we
introduce the machine learning approach that is used to build the prediction system.
In Section 2.4, we present our failure prediction model and in Section 2.5, we do
the performance evaluation of our system. Finally, we summarize the chapter in
Section 2.6.

2.2

Related Work

Quite a number of prior studies attempt to characterize failures in supercomputers
and clouds from the perspective of system failures [37, 139] and application failures
[70, 116]. Samak et al. [124] develop a data model of workflows that can characterize
failures observed during the execution of large scientific applications on Amazon EC2.
Their approach focused on detecting failures of jobs, and relating those failures to
the job type. Findings from their analysis was used to build a job failure behavior
model. This model facilitates the job scheduler for making better scheduling decisions.
Kavulya et al. [70] investigate logs from Hadoop applications and characterize their
job patterns and the failure reasons. Ren et al. [116] analyze the logs collected from
Hadoop clusters running e-commerce applications. In contrast, the Google dataset
which we used in our scheme has a more diverse workload, and hence our findings
are applicable to a wider range of cloud applications. Fadishei et al. [39] analyze
workload traces from The Grid Workload Archive project [62]. They discover correlations between job failures and performance metrics such as memory usage, CPU
utilization, queue utilization, exit hour and migration of jobs, etc. Although all of
these works tried to characterize workload patterns by finding correlation between
resource measures and failure manifestations, they are limited to particular classes
of jobs and tasks. In contrast, our analysis explores such correlations with a more
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diverse workload in a production cloud environment.
There have been a number of studies on the Google cluster dataset focusing on the
workload characterization and machine utilization. Reiss et al. [114] present a comprehensive study of the Google cluster traces in recent times. They provide a broad
characterization of the workload that focuses on issues such as cluster utilization, job
and task properties affecting the scheduler, resource request versus actual usage, and
the challenges in task scheduling. Their study identifies two important characteristics
that may warrant new scheduler design. First, they observe some under-utilization
of resources (i.e., significant mismatch between resource requests and actual resource
usage). Second, they notice substantial delays in the scheduling of some requests that
have constraints.
Guan et al. [56] use principal component analysis on the task resource consumption to identify the features most likely to influence failures. They find that the
average correlations of the raw resource usage to the failures are around 0.07 in all
tasks. In contrast, we perform fine-grained analysis on different classes of jobs and
resources, and we find much higher correlations and more significant differences between failures and successful terminations. For example, in our analysis, at least
34.8% of the jobs have significant differences between the resource consumption of
failed and finished tasks. They further propose a principal component analysis based
algorithm to identify anomalies (failures) by monitoring performance metrics. Their
algorithm is essentially built on dimension reduction, which is oriented to their selfcollected data with hundreds of dimensions, but show much less accuracy in the
Google trace with only 12 dimensions of resource measures. Their goal is equivalent
to the task level classification in our algorithm, while we have higher accuracy. More
importantly, we predict job failures and propose applying early prediction results to
save resources. Garraghan et al. [47] study the node and task failures’ statistical distributions, including mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to repair
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(MTTR). However, distributions are not enough to characterize machine and task
failures, as the workload is highly diverse. In contrast, we use job and cloud system
attributes to understand the correlations between job failures and attributes. They
also label the node maintenance as failures. However, Reiss et al. [113] observed that
node maintenance is mostly planned downtime, and hence different from failures. Finally, they do not consider the correlations between resource consumption of the jobs
and their failures.
Failure prediction based on runtime system metrics is an important area of research. Researchers have applied various methods that use the results of failure
analysis and workload characterization to failure detection and prediction in supercomputer and cloud clusters [39, 80, 97]. These methods can be generally categorized
into four groups: 1) rule-based schemes, 2) classifiers (e.g., naive Bayes, decision trees,
fuzzy, etc.), 3) statistical testing (e.g., mean square error (MSE), mean absolute error
(MAE), etc.), and 4) time series analysis. Our prediction scheme is not restricted to
a single category– our scheme in fact builds on the last three categories mentioned
above.
Failure prediction can help in improving the performance of an entire system.
Oliner et al. [96] demonstrate that failure-aware scheduling can be effective even with
the modest prediction accuracy. They show that improved scheduling of parallel jobs
has significant impact on the job response time and overall system utilization. Liu
et al. [79] focus on adjusting the placement of active or running jobs in response
to failure prediction, and propose an application-level job migration and processor
swapping approach to diminish the impact of failures. Our work is orthogonal to the
above techniques, as it deals with failure prediction, which can facilitate failure aware
scheduling and placement. Modeling the time series data has been a subject of active
research in the past decades [90]. Classical time series problems are composed of
video/speech recognition, stock market prediction, motion capture data recognition,
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and physiological data recognition. Similar to these topics, performance data in the
cloud cluster have a large volume and high heterogeneity, and are certainly a difficult
task for machine learning algorithms to analyze these data, learn, and then predict
the outcome. Graves et al. [54] propose a method to train Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to label unsegmented sequences. The results outperform the previous
dominant Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).

2.3

Background

This section provides a brief introduction to the Google cluster dataset, statistical
properties of jobs and tasks that correlate to failures and a finally presents the machine
learning technique used to design the failure prediction system.

2.3.1

Google Cluster Trace Overview

The cluster trace released by Google consists of data collected from approximately
12,500 machines [115]. It includes a trace of all cluster scheduler requests and actions, a trace of per-task resource usage over time, and a trace of machine availability.
The trace describes hundreds of thousands of jobs, submitted by users. Each job is
composed of one to tens of thousands of tasks, which are programs to be executed
on an available machine. A task represents a Linux program, possibly spanning multiple processes, to be run on a single machine. Each task is specified with various
parameters, including priority, resource request (estimated maximum CPU and memory needed), and sometimes, with constraints. For each task, the trace also indicates
each time it is submitted, assigned to a machine, or descheduled. These records allow
us to examine task and job durations and identify unusual task and scheduler behavior. The trace also includes per-assigned-task resource usage information every five
minutes from every machine [114].
A simplified model of the states through which a job or task progresses is shown
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by the top path in Figure 2.1 [115]: a job is SUBMITted and gets put into a pending
queue; soon afterwards, it is SCHEDULEd onto a machine and starts running; some
time later it FINISHes successfully. If a task or job that has been EVICTed, has
FAILed, or has been KILLed remains runnable, a SUBMIT event will appear immediately after the descheduling events (i.e., the system tries to restart jobs and tasks
that have failed.). The actual policy about how many times tasks can be rescheduled
in spite of abnormal termination varies between jobs.

Figure 2.1: State transitions for jobs and tasks in Google cluster trace. [115]
Each task description has scheduling attributes associated with it. Most notable
are its priority, resource requests, and constraints. Priority refers to the entitlement
to evict other tasks for resource reclamation. Resource request indicates machine
resources the task asks for, and task constraints indirectly specify which machines
are suitable for execution. Priority is associated only with tasks, and not with jobs.
In addition to the scheduling attributes mentioned above, the trace contains usage
data for most tasks which run. Most resource utilization measurements and requests
have been normalized, including: mean and max CPU time (core count), mean and
max memory usage (bytes), mean and max disk space usage (bytes), mapped and
unmapped page cache memory, and some other measurements (such as cycles per instruction, memory access per instruction, etc.). For each of the above measurements,
separate normalizations are computed. The normalization is a scaling relative to the
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largest capacity of the resource on any machine in the trace (which is 1.0).

2.3.2

Trace Data Analysis

To build an efficient and reliable failure prediction system it is important to understand the trace data and extract the relevant features. We conduct a thorough
study on the trace data and identify the following job and task features that mainly
contribute to scheduling decisions.
Termination Events: We observed that 42% of the jobs and 40% of the tasks did
not complete successfully. These are mostly failed or killed; evicted and lost are very
rare events. We focus only on the finished, and failed events as termination events.
Resource Consumption: The average CPU and memory consumption of failed and
killed jobs are at least twice as much as of finished jobs. And the total amount of
CPU and memory consumption of failed and killed jobs are approximately three times
those of finished jobs. This demonstrates a strong correlation between the resource
consumption of jobs and their correlation to failure.
Task Resubmissions: Task resubmission is a common event during the life cycle a
job. We find that about 75% of the jobs have tasks that are re-executed at most four
times. Tasks are resubmitted usually if any of the three events namely, failures (e.g.,
software crashes), evictions (e.g., resource over-commitment, competing workload,
hardware failures), or kills (e.g., underlying reason unspecified) occur. We also observe
that on an average, the number of task resubmissions for failed jobs are much higher
than those of finished jobs.
Scheduling Delay: We observe that jobs and tasks that do not finish (i.e., killed,
failed, evicted, or lost) have a long waiting time compare to the finished jobs and
tasks. We find significant task scheduling delays for some requests that have task
constraints.
Scheduling Constraints: Task priority and scheduling class together constitute
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scheduling constraints. Scheduling class represents how latency-sensitive a task is,
while task priority decides whether a task is scheduled on a machine. Our study
reveals that the highest and the lowest priority jobs experience higher rate of failures
than the medium priority batch jobs.
Job Duration: Most jobs are short and they contribute very little to the overall
resource utilization. In fact 2% of the jobs use 80% of the resource. About 67% of the
jobs run for less than 5 minutes and about 20% for less than a minute. We observe
that finished jobs are shorter than both failed jobs and killed jobs, on average.
User-specific Behavior: There are a total of 925 users in the trace. However, it is
evident from our analysis that the jobs run by only a small number of users have a
large effect on the scheduler performance. Although no user accounts for more than
15% of the CPU or memory usage, more than half of the CPU or memory usage are
from the top 10 users. And the top 100 users account for more than 95% of the usage.
Furthermore, long running jobs represent about 34% of those users. Like long jobs,
short jobs are not dominated by a small subset of users.

2.3.3

Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Architecture

Traditional machine learning methods are much less effective than Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN). Unlike the popular artificial Feed-forward Neural Networks (FNN)
and Support Vector Machines (SVM), RNN can not only deal with stationary input
and output patterns but also with pattern sequences of arbitrary length [82]. Although FNN and SVM have been successful in restricted applications, they assume
that all their inputs are stationary and independent of each other. However, in real
world, normally past events influence future events and a temporary memory of events
that happened a while ago may be essential for producing a useful output action later.
RNN can be used to implement arbitrary types of such short-term memories or internal states by means of their recurrent connections; FNN and SVM cannot [60]. In
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fact, RNN can implement real sequence-processing and sequence-producing programs
with loops and temporary variables, while FNN and SVM are limited to simple feedforward mappings from inputs to outputs. Therefore, RNN can solve many tasks that
are unsolvable by FNN and SVM.
Different from traditional time series data, the Google cluster trace contains a
large amount of high dimensional (i.e., data with numerous attributes or features)
and noisy data that are diverse in nature and have dependencies on the past events.
Therefore, FNN and SVM models are not suitable for analyzing this data. The
traditional RNN on the other hand has a serious drawback for data with long-term
dependencies. The error-signals could exhibit exponential decay as they are backpropagated through time, which leads to long-term signal being effectively lost as
they are overwhelmed by un-decayed short term signals [50]. To overcome this issue,
we have chosen the LSTM network that can capture the long-term dependencies and
also capable of modeling the temporal connections between hidden states.

Figure 2.2: An LSTM memory cell with a forget gate. [82]
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The Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model was proposed by Hochreiter et
al.

[60]. The term “long short-term memory” comes from the following intuition.

Simple recurrent neural networks have long-term memory in the form of weights.
The weights change slowly during training, encoding general knowledge about the
data. The LSTM model introduces an intermediate type of storage called memory
cell. Unlike the standard RNN with a hidden layer, in LSTM, each ordinary node
in the hidden layer is replaced by a memory cell. Each memory cell is a composite
unit built from simpler nodes that are connected through some multiplicative nodes
(represented by the symbol Π in Figure 2.2). A standard memory cell of a LSTM
consists of the following elements [82]:
Input node: Input node, denoted as gc , takes activation from the input data
point x(t) at the current time step and from the hidden layer at the previous time
step h(t−1) . Usually, the summed weighted input is run through a tanh activation
function (although in the original LSTM paper, the activation function was a sigmoid
function).
Input gate: Input gate, denoted as ic , takes activation from the current input data
point x(t) as well as from the previous hidden layer data. A gate is so-called because
its value is used to multiply the value of another node. It is a gate in the sense that
if its value is zero, then flow from the other node is cut off. If the value of the gate is
one, all flows pass through. The value of the input gate ic multiplies the value of the
input node gc .
Internal state: The internal state sc is the central part of an LSTM memory cell
that has a self-connected recurrent edge with fixed unit weight. This edge spans
adjacent time steps with constant weight. Therefore, error can flow across time steps
without vanishing or exploding. This edge is often called the constant error carousel.
Forget gate: Forget gates fc were not part of the original LSTM design, these were
introduced later by Gers et al. [50]. These gates provide a method of “learning to
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forget” -the LSTM network learns to flush the contents of the internal state.
Output gate: The output gate is denoted as oc , which is multiplied by the internal
state sc to produce the final value vc of a memory cell.
Put formally, computation in the LSTM model proceeds according to the following
calculations, which are performed at each time step. These equations give the full
algorithm for a modern LSTM with forget gates:

g (t) = Φ(W gx x (t) + W gh h (t−1) + b g )
i (t) = σ(W ix x (t) + W ih h (t−1) + b i )
f (t) = σ(W f x x (t) + W f h h (t−1) + b f )
o (t) = σ(W ox x (t) + W oh h (t−1) + b o )
s (t) = g (t)

i (t) + s (t−1)

h (t) = Φ(s (t)

f (t)

o (t) )

where, W ∗ are weight matrices; and b∗ are bias vectors. For example, W ix is the
matrix of weights from the input gate to the input and bi is the input gate bias vector.
σ is the logistic sigmoid function and Φ denotes the tanh function.

2.4

System Model

Our proposed failure prediction model consists of five stages as shown in Figure 2.3:
(1) monitoring and storing the system and application metrics, (2) processing data to
structured formats containing their spatial and temporal information, (3) extracting
relevant features from data, (4) predicting failures using machine learning model, and
(5) failure remediation management based on the predicted results. The monitoring
module is not at the center of the reliability study. Additionally, in existing cloud
traces, the system and application metrics are already provided. Therefore, we focus
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on the data processing, feature extraction, and failure prediction. We address this
and propose a solution to this in the next chapter.

Figure 2.3: Proposed Failure Prediction Method

2.4.1

Data Preprocessing

The goal of the data preprocessing step is to formulate the collected performance
data from the monitoring module into layered application-centric structures, which
are required by our failure prediction model. In the Google cluster trace, original
data tables of system and application metrics cover task resource usage measures
and various attributes of the jobs, tasks, nodes and users in separate files. We join
those tables to get the associated performance data of each job and task. Now, each
job has performance data of all its tasks, the job/task/node/user attributes, and
the failure data (i.e., job/task termination statuses). Thus we get the job and task
level structured data along with their respective termination statuses (i.e., failed or
finished)

2.4.2

Feature Extraction

In the training phase of our LSTM network, we use the following resource measures
from the Google trace: mean CPU usage, mean memory usage, unmapped page cache,
mean disk I/O, and mean disk usage. Along with these measures we add the following
eight attributes as our inputs: user ID, job Id, task index, priority, scheduling class,
job duration, number of task resubmissions, and scheduling delay. Each measure is
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represented by a class in the input sequences, and thus the inputs have thirteen classes
of measures at any single time point. The original sampling intervals range from a few
seconds to a few minutes. Therefore, we choose time ranges of 30 seconds, 1 minute
and 5 minutes, and average the resource usage measurements in these ranges. For
the target sequences, we consider task termination statuses in the failed and finished
jobs. In the logistic regression layer, the termination statuses generated in the LSTM
model are taken as inputs of features. The outputs are the termination statuses of
jobs or tasks.

2.4.3

Applying LSTM Model

Our model is composed of a single LSTM layer followed by an average pooling and
a logistic regression layer as illustrated in the Figure 2.4 [83]. Thus, from an input
sequence x0 , x1 , x2 , ..., xn , the memory cells in the LSTM layer will produce a
representation sequence h0 , h1 , h2 , ..., hn . This representation sequence is then
averaged over all time-steps resulting in representation h. Finally, this representation
is fed to a logistic regression layer whose target is the class label (i.e., fail or finish)
associated with the input sequence.

2.4.4

Cross Validation

We divide the dataset into k (i.e., k = 10) subsets; each time, one of the k subsets
is used as the test set and the other k-1 subsets are put together to form a training
set. Then the average error across all k trials is computed. The advantage of this
method is that it matters less how the data gets divided. Every data point gets to
be in a test exactly once, and gets to be in a training set k-1 times. The variance of
the resulting estimate is reduced as k is increased. The disadvantage of this method
is that the training algorithm has to be rerun from scratch k times, which means it
takes k times as much computation to make an evaluation.
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Figure 2.4: A single LSTM layer with mean pooling over time and logistic regression. [83]
2.5

Performance Evaluation

We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of our prediction system and
evaluated its performance using Google cluster dataset. In this section, we present
our experimental results.

2.5.1

Experiment Settings

Intel Xeon E5640 quad-core processor running at 2.66GHz each with a GTX 960 GPU.
We use “Keras” [45] –a minimalist, highly modular neural networks library, written
in Python and capable of running on top of either TensorFlow [3] or Theano [10]. The
traces are originally stored in comma separated value files of approximate size 200GB,
and the data attributes are represented by key-value pairs. We load these data into
a MySQL database for ease of analysis. Due to the large size involved, we deploy
databases on AmazonWeb Services (AWS) [1] for queries. The failure prediction
module leverages machine learning packages in Python [102] for the prediction.
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2.5.2

Evaluation Metrics

In order to measure the quality of a prediction system, it is important to specify
the evaluation metrics first. Our goal is to design an efficient predictor to predict
failure correctly and cover as many failure events as possible while generating very
few false positives. Following list of metrics are used in our experiment to evaluate
performance: Accuracy, Precision, True Positive Rate (TPR) or Sensitivity or Recall,
False Positive Rate (FPR), True Negative Rate (TNR) or Specificity, and F-measure
or F1 Score.
Table 2.1: Failure Prediction at Task Level
Test
TEST1
TEST2
TEST3
TEST4
TEST5
TEST6
TEST7
TEST8
TEST9
TEST10
Average

2.5.3

Accuracy
0.82
0.87
0.84
0.85
0.90
0.89
0.87
0.85
0.89
0.90
0.87

Precision
0.80
0.89
0.85
0.86
0.91
0.92
0.88
0.89
0.94
0.92
0.89

TPR
0.82
0.86
0.82
0.83
0.89
0.85
0.85
0.82
0.85
0.88
0.85

TNR
0.81
0.88
0.85
0.88
0.91
0.93
0.88
0.89
0.93
0.92
0.89

FPR
0.19
0.12
0.15
0.12
0.09
0.07
0.12
0.11
0.07
0.08
0.11

F1 Score
0.81
0.88
0.83
0.84
0.90
0.89
0.86
0.85
0.89
0.90
0.87

Task Level Failure Prediction

At the task level, we classify the termination statuses of task submissions based
on the attributes and performance data. In all the target classes, the status finish
is considered as one class, and the other three classes, i.e., evict, kill and fail, are
considered as a single class due to the reliability and severity. We evaluate the task
level classification in Table 2.1. We observe that the classification achieves around
87% of accuracy, 85% of sensitivity and 89% of specificity. With the high true positive
rate and low false positive rate, the task level classification serves as the foundation
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for predicting failures at the job level .

2.5.4

Job Level failure Prediction

At the job level, we classify the termination statuses of jobs into two classes: failed
and finished. Table 2.2 shows the prediction results with 10-fold cross validation. We
observe an accuracy of 81%, true positive rate of 83%. However, false positive rate is
20%, which is a bit higher compared to the task level results.
Table 2.2: Failure Prediction at Job Level
Test
TEST1
TEST2
TEST3
TEST4
TEST5
TEST6
TEST7
TEST8
TEST9
TEST10
Average

2.5.5

Accuracy
0.79
0.81
0.80
0.80
0.84
0.84
0.82
0.81
0.79
0.82
0.81

Precision
0.85
0.78
0.77
0.78
0.82
0.82
0.80
0.80
0.76
0.80
0.80

TPR
0.70
0.84
0.82
0.83
0.88
0.85
0.85
0.81
0.83
0.87
0.83

TNR
0.88
0.79
0.79
0.76
0.81
0.84
0.79
0.80
0.76
0.77
0.80

FPR
0.12
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.19
0.16
0.21
0.20
0.24
0.23
0.20

F1 Score
0.77
0.81
0.79
0.80
0.85
0.84
0.82
0.80
0.79
0.83
0.81

Relative Resource Saving

Our analysis on Google trace data reveals that finished jobs have much shorter running times than failed and killed jobs. This implies that a lot of resources (i.e., CPU,
memory, service time, etc.) are wasted on jobs that do not finish, except those that
are for debugging or testing purposes. And we noticed that there is a strong correlation between the resource consumption of jobs and their propensity to failure. This
warrants the necessity for early failure prediction. Moreover, the termination statuses (i.e., finished, killed, failed, etc.) of jobs are influenced by the jobs’ pre-launch
attributes (e.g., priority, scheduling class, task constraints, resubmission rules, etc.).
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It is evident from our analysis that failed and killed jobs have higher number of task
resubmissions. To save resources, it might be a good idea to limit the number of
task resubmissions if a job is predicted to fail or terminate unsuccessfully, especially
for automated resubmissions. To estimate the relative resource savings due to failure
prediction, we calculated the following.

Rs : Resource saved due to correct job failure prediction
Rw : Resource wasted due to incorrect job failure prediction
Rt : Total resource consumption by failed and finished jobs

The relative resource savings is calculated as:

Rrel =

Rs − Rw
Rt

We simulate a selected set of jobs (long and medium multi-task batch jobs that
are predicted ‘to be failed’) in a distributed cloud simulator called GloudSim [34],
and integrate our prediction system to that. Using 10-fold cross validation we make
predictions at the job level at three different time slots (i.e., quarter, half, and threequarter of the job’s running time). Our analysis reveals that, even if we resubmit
(i.e., kill and restart/resubmit) the ”predicted to be failed” jobs up to a maximum
number of times (e.g., 5 times), we end up saving 11% of CPU, 16% of memory and
18% of the service time on average. Our results are presented in Figure 2.5 and 2.6.
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Figure 2.5: Relative Resource Savings for multi-task batch long jobs

Figure 2.6: Relative Resource Savings for multi-task batch medium jobs

2.5.6

Performance Comparison with Other Models

When we have a new dataset, it is a good idea to visualize the data using different
techniques in order to look at the data from different perspectives. The same idea
applies to model selection. Therefore, it is important to compare the performance of
multiple different machine learning algorithms consistently. Each model has different
performance characteristics. Using resampling methods like cross validation, we get
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an estimate for how accurate each model may be on unseen data. We apply 10-fold
cross validation on the three models (i.e., FNN, SVM, LSTM) using the same dataset.
Figure 2.7 shows the results. It is evident that LSTM outperforms both FNN and
SVM in terms of accuracy.

Figure 2.7: Task Failure Prediction Accuracy.

2.6

Summary

With the emergence of large, heterogeneous, shared computing clusters, their efficient
use by mixed distributed workloads and tenants remains an important challenge. Unfortunately, very little data has been available about such workloads and clusters. In
this chapter, we analyzed a Google release of scheduler request and utilization data
across a large (12.5K+) general-purpose compute cluster of nearly one month period.
We noticed that failed and finished jobs and tasks have different characteristics of resource usage, and these differences have a high probability of manifesting well before
the jobs’ completion. The study points to the importance of failure prediction for
resource provisioning and scheduling in compute clouds. We then presented a prediction model, which builds on a special type of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
called Long Short Term Memory Network (LSTM) and logistic regression, for predict50

ing failures via various attributes and performance time series data. Our model helps
in predicting the termination statuses of tasks and jobs in the Google cluster traces
with a decent accuracy, precision, and recall. Our model also achieved a false positive
rate of 11% at the task level and 20% at the job level. Furthermore, at the job level,
12% - 20% of resources are saved using early prediction at the halfway points of job
executions.
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Chapter 3

A Fault-Tolerant Cloud Scheduler Based On Failure Predictions using
Long Short-Term Memory Network

In this chapter, we present a task scheduler that dynamically reschedules tasks based
on the failure prediction results leveraging the model introduced in the previous chapter. This proactive fault-tolerant scheduler improves system reliability and ensures
timely execution of the applications. Simulation results show that our scheduler reduces makespan and failure rates of tasks substantially while balancing load at the
same time. Moreover, early prediction along with quick scheduling adjustment improves overall resource utilization and reduces resource wastage.

3.1

Introduction

Failure is inevitable in any large-scale cloud computing system. In the era of service
and software offerings, we frequently talk about failures in terms of hardware faults,
downtime, crashes, and interruptions in service accessibility and availability. However,
applications in cloud also suffer from scheduling failures (i.e., task and job failures)
due to the dynamics of runtime cloud states, heterogeneity of configurations, and
unpredictable resource requirements. Existing workflow engines are not adequate to
cope with scheduling failures; they apply either retry or resubmission strategy which
does not ensure reliable and timely execution of tasks or jobs. One approach to handle
this is to execute the job by deploying it in different regions to eliminate the risk of
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single point of failure– which is clearly a computation overhead.
A variety of task scheduling algorithms [68, 69, 159] have been proposed in literature that are reactive in nature. These methods address the scheduling problem by
applying post failure remediation methods. They are not efficient, because by the
time they discover a pattern of failures, huge amount of resources already could have
been wasted. Although proactive fault management methods have been proposed by
some researchers, they however consider only workload prediction [31], resource allocation and load balancing [103], and task execution time [147]. None of these schemes
dealt with failure-aware scheduling. Hence, application-centric failure prediction and
adaptive rescheduling could be a promising option to build a fault tolerant cloud.
To build such a cloud environment, real world production data are needed. It is a
challenging task due to the scarcity of real world data trace. Cloud service providers
usually do not want to disclose customer data due to confidentiality reason. Moreover, even if data trace becomes available, they are close to big data in volume, and
processing such an enormous amount of data is a computation-intensive task.
Objectives. In this chapter, we present our scheme where we aim is to build a
fault-tolerant task scheduler for cloud that ensures: 1) Failure-aware Reliable Scheduling: schedule tasks timely and place them in proper nodes taking into account their
failure probability; 2) Efficient Resource Utilization: dynamically adjust resource
allocation to tasks for maintaining a decent degree of load balance. 3) Maximum
Throughput: migrate a failure-prone task only when transferring it on the new node
warrants an improved task completion time and also satisfies the above two constraints.
Contributions. Following are the major contributions in this direction:
• We present FaCS, a fault-tolerant cloud scheduler that blends a failure prediction model with a task scheduling algorithm. Based on the prediction result,
FaCS performs task rescheduling.
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• Our task migration algorithm not only ensures a decent degree of load balance
throughout the system but also reduces task completion time.
• We emulate a number of jobs collected from the Google trace in a distributed
cloud simulator called GloudSim [34] and measure the performance of our scheduler. Result shows that, our scheduler can optimize resource utilization, reduce
failure rate and job execution time substantially.
• We compute related resource savings in a node using a simple algorithm. We
observe that, if we can predict task termination status accurately and adapt
our scheduler based on that, we end up saving a significant amount of system
resources.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We present some related work
in Section 3.2. We present our proposed model in Section 3.3 and implementation
and performance evaluation in Section 3.4. Finally, we summarize this chapter in
Section 3.5.

3.2

Related Work

Kang et al. [69] propose a distributed scheduling strategy leveraging node availability
prediction. Assuming the loads are divisible, at each processing phase, their scheduler decides the size of the load chunk and selects a computing node to process that
chunk. Kanemitsu [68] present a prior node selection algorithm which considers job
characteristics, node’s performance, and scheduling priority while scheduling workflows. Peng et al. [103] propose a job scheduling scheme using reinforcement learning.
They perform load balancing to achieve reduced makespan and average wait time.
Wang et al. [147] presented three QoS aware adapting task allocation schemes:
i) a measurement driven algorithm based on reinforcement learning, ii) an allocation
algorithm that assigns tasks to sub-systems that are likely to provide a lower response
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time, and iii) an algorithm that splits the task arrival stream into sub-streams at rates
computed from the hosts’ processing capabilities. Cortez et al. [31] propose a workload prediction framework based on an extensive set of VM characteristics (e.g., VM
lifetimes, maximum deployment sizes, and workload classes). Their scheme facilitates
smart VM scheduling, cluster selection, and scheduling of server maintenance.
Sedaghat et al. [126] proposed a statistical reliability model that studies the impact of stochastic and correlated failures on job reliability in a data center. Soualhia et
al. [129] propose a task scheduler for Hadoop that is capable of adjusting its scheduling decisions based on task-failure prediction results. Yildiz et al. [159] propose a
scheduling scheme for failed tasks in Hadoop clusters. Once failure is detected, recovery tasks are immediately launched in this scheme. Instead of waiting for an indefinite
period of time to get the required resources, it performs preemption operation on the
low priority tasks and allocates the acquired resources to recovery tasks.

3.3
3.3.1

System Model
FaCS Architecture

In this chapter, we present FaCS, a fault-tolerant cloud scheduler which is capable of
adjusting its scheduling decisions dynamically based on the system and application
performance metrics. Our scheme is built on six modules: i) performance monitoring,
ii) data collection and preprocessing, iii) feature extraction and engineering, iv) training and building of the model, v) evaluation of the prediction network, and finally, vi)
failure remediation. Since we use the Google cluster trace as our data set, the system
and application metrics are already available to us. This data is primarily derived
from monitoring data that Google collected through periodic remote procedure calls
(RPCs). Moreover, Google also performed data cleaning and normalization to make
the data consistent and usable for research. Hence, we focus on the modules iii) to
vi) in this chapter.
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3.3.2

Feature Engineering

Understanding the trace data and extracting relevant features from it is the key to
feature engineering. We conduct a thorough study on the Google trace and extract
the attributes that are correlated to potential failures. We identify several factors
such as, task/job termination status, average resource consumption, number of task
resubmissions, scheduling delay and constraints, task/job duration, and user-centric
behavior. Along with these measures, we add few other attributes (chosen directly
from the trace) to build our failure prediction model.

3.3.3

Failure Prediction Framework

The failure prediction framework basically comprises of three modules– feature engineering, network modeling and prediction. Our input data is represented as vectors
and their elements are labeled as scalars (1s and 0s). Hence, we build a network by
stacking a few fully connected dense layers that performs well on such data. We make
several key architectural decisions for our network in this phase; we choose the total
number of layers to be 3, and the number of hidden units in each intermediate layer
be 16. We then choose the relu (rectified linear unit) activation function for the
two intermediate layers and sigmoid activation for the top layer. The relu function
zeroes out the negative values whereas the sigmoid “squashes” arbitrary values in the
[0, 1] interval to be interpreted as a probability.
In failure prediction scheme, we predict the termination status of a task, which
is a binary classification problem. Therefore, for training the network model, we
choose binary crossentropy as our loss function and rmsprop (i.e., root mean square
propagation) as the optimizer. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between LSTM layers
with loss function, optimizer and our proposed 3-layered LSTM implementation [28].
As we see, input X passes through the data transformation layers that are chained
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together, and a prediction value Y* on the input X is computed. The loss function
measures the difference (i.e., loss score) between the predicted and the true output;
and finally the optimizer updates the network’s weight matrices based on the loss
score. We monitor the training accuracy of our model by creating a validating data
set that is different from the original training data that the model has never seen
before. We use the standard k-fold validation for this training. Finally, after having
trained the network, we test it to generate predictions on new data.

Figure 3.1: Relationship between LSTM layers, loss function, and optimizer

3.3.4

Task Rescheduling

From the trace data, we observe that Google scheduler consistently resubmits tasks
when they fail, and about 75% of the jobs have tasks that are re-executed at most
four times. Most importantly, we notice that the number of task resubmissions for
failed jobs are much higher than those of the finished jobs. We believe that, if we can
predict the changes in the environment during the lifecycle of a job or task, we might
be able to dynamically reschedule them by reevaluating the resource constraints and
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the updated system status.
Algorithm 1: Failure-aware Task Rescheduling
input : < task >, < node >, maxResub
output: < Rescheduled T asks >
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

for each taskj ∈ nodei do
U sagej ← getUsage (taskj );
Statusj ← failurePrediction (U sagej );
if Statusj == F AIL then
if numResubj ≥ maxResub then
nodemig ← findNode(< node >);
Migrate(taskj , nodemig );
else
loadi ← measureLoad (nodei );
if loadi ≥ threshold then
nodemig ← findNode(< node >);
Migrate(taskj , nodemig );
updateLoad(<node>);
else
numResubj ← numResubj + 1;
Resubmit(taskj , nodei );

Algorithm 1 describes our proposed task rescheduling scheme. We set a limit on
the maximum number (maxResub) of task resubmission (after a task fails). Once
that limit exceeds, if the task still remains in fail state, our algorithm invokes the
task migration function. In line 1-3, each task’s resource usage value is collected from
the node it is running, and then the termination status of that task is predicted. If
the task is predicted to fail, and also reaches its maximum resubmission number, the
algorthim tries to find a suitable node to migrate the task (line 4-7). If the task
does not reach its maximum resubmission count, the algorithm measures the load of
that node (line 8-9). Based on node’s current load, the algorthim either tries to find
another suitable node to migrate the task (line 10-13) or simply resubmits the task
to the current node and updates its resubmission count (line 14-16).
Algorithm 2 briefly summarizes how a candidate node for migrating a task is
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selected. For each node nodei , it computes a value-pair (loadi , compT imei ): the load
of that node and the expected completion time of the task taskj on that particular
node. It selects a minimum value-pair, where the newly selected node has a decent
workload and also warrants an improved task completion time compared to all other
value-pairs in the system.
Algorithm 2: Selecting a Migration Candidate Node : ;
findNode(< node >) for taskj
input : < node >, taskj
output: nodemig
1
2
3

for each nodei ∈ < node > do
loadi ← measureLoad (nodei );
CTi ← taskCompTime (nodei , taskj );

5

for i ← 1 to N do
nodemig ← findMinimum (< loadi , CTi >);

6

return nodemig ;

4

3.3.5

Relative Resource Saving

The Google trace data manifests a significant difference on the resource consumption
of finished jobs (and tasks) compared to that of failed and killed jobs (and tasks).
Jobs that are finished had much shorter execution time. That means, a substantial
amount of resources are wasted due to jobs that do not complete. An early failure
prediction algorithm with an efficient rescheduling scheme can definitely improve
throughput in this scenario. We present our resource saving approach in Algorithm
3. Rsaved and Rwastage are computed taking into account the correct and incorrect
failure prediction respectively. Rtotal denotes the total resource consumption by failed
and finished tasks. The relative resource saving (Rrel ) is the ratio of the net resource
savings (Rsaved - Rwastage ) to the total resource consumption (Rtotal ).
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Algorithm 3: Related Resource Saving in a Node
input : < task >, nodei , < trueStatus >
output: Rrel
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

3.4
3.4.1

for each taskj ∈ nodei do
U sagej ← getUsage (taskj );
Statusj ← failurePrediction (U sagej );
if Statusj == trueStausj then
j
← computeSaving (taskj );
Rsaved
else
j
Rwastage
← computeWastage (taskj );
Rtotal ← Rtotal + U sagej ;
j
;
Rsaved ← Rsaved + Rsaved
j
Rwastage ← Rwastage + Rwastage ;
Rrel ← (Rsaved - Rwastage ) / Rtotal ;
return Rrel ;
Performance Evaluation
Task Failure Prediction Model

We use Keras (https://keras.io), a scalable deep-learning framework for Python
that provides an efficient way to build and train any machine learning model. We
implement the model on a machine that has Intel Xen E5640 quad-core processor
running at 2.66 GHz with GTX 980 GPU. We first define our training data that
comprises of i) input sequence and ii) target output. To extract relevant features from
the trace data we mainly consider three tables: i) task events, ii) task constraints,
and iii) resource usage. We include the following twelve resource measures in our
input: mean and max CPU; mean, max, and assigned memory; mean and max disk
I/O time; mapped and unmapped page cache memory; mean local disk space; cycles
per instruction (CPI); and memory access per instruction (MPI). For task specific
data, we select eight more attributes which are: task index (within a job), task start
and end time, job ID, user ID, machine ID, priority, and scheduling class. Along with
these, we generate and add three more compound attributes: job duration, number
of task resubmission, and scheduling delay. We represent each of these attributes as
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a class in our input sequence, and hence, we have twenty three classes of attributes in
our input data at any given time. Our target output (in the target output sequence)
is the termination status of any task. Hence, we consider only two classes of target
here: i) finish and ii) fail (includes fail, evict, and kill events of tasks). As described
previously, our LSTM prediction model comprises of two dense layers followed by a
logistic regression layer. First, we pass our input sequence x0 , x1 , ... , xn to the
dense layers, which transform the input sequence (through a series of steps explained
earlier) into a corresponding intermediate sequence h0 , h1 , ... , hn . We use an average
pooling function to further transform the sequence into a single representation h,
which is eventually fed to the logistic regression layer so as to output a target class
(fail or finish). To train and test our model, we use 10-fold cross validation; each time
one of the 10 subsets we use as the test set and the other 9 subsets we put together
to form training set. We achieve a prediction accuracy of 91% at the task level with
a false positive of only 8%.

3.4.2

Task Rescheduling Scheme

We implement our task rescheduling scheme based on the results of the failure prediction model. We use a cloud simulator called GloudSim [34], developed especially to
emulate the Google trace data as closely as possible. GloudSim also has an interface
to customize and integrate user-designed scheduling algorithm like ours. We simulate
a selected set of multi-task batch jobs of short, medium, and long lengths; predict the
termination status of the tasks associated with these jobs; and then apply our task
rescheduling algorithm. We consider five measures to evaluate the performance our
task rescheduling algorithm– they are: i) CPU usage, ii) memory usage, iii) failure
rate, iv) degree of load balance, and v) average makespan (job execution time).
In our experiment, we perform failure prediction and rescheduling on the task
level. However, we analyze and evaluate the performance on the job level, so that we
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can illustrate the results on a coarse-grained level. We measure the performance of our
scheduler by comparing with two other schedulers– one is the Original Scheduler,
and the other is, Prediction & Resubmission. The original scheduler is simulated using a First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) algorithm along with Berkeley Lab
Checkpoint/Restart (BLCR) tool [34]. We build the other scheduler by combining
failure prediction with task resubmission.

Figure 3.2: Overall Performance After Rescheduling

We present the overall performance of our scheduler in Figure 3.2. We simulate
200 batch jobs of short (4-10 minutes) and medium (10-30 minutes) lengths and
compare their CPU and memory usage. From Figure 3.2(a) and Figure 3.2(b), we
observe that, our scheduler outperforms the other two schedulers and our scheduler
uses 10% less CPU time and 19% less memory compared to the original scheduler.
We notice a significant decrease in failure rate in Figure 3.2(c), when we simulate
500 short and medium jobs. The improvement is 23% and 18% compared to the
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Original Scheduler and the Prediction & Resubmission scheduler respectively.
Figure 3.2(d) compares load balance in a scale between 0 to 1 (i.e., greater score
represents better balance). We observe a 21% improvement on load balance than
the original scheduler. Figure 3.2(e) and Figure 3.2(f) compare the makespan (i.e.,
job execution time). We notice a makespan drop of 13% for shorter length jobs and
around 28% drop for medium length jobs than the original scheduler.

3.4.3

Resource Savings After Rescheduling

We predict a task’s termination status at different time slots based on its estimated
task length– quarter, half, and three-quarter of its running time. Afterwards, we
reschedule it considering the prediction result and monitor its performance.
We calculate the related resource savings using Algorithm 3 as stated in section 3.3.5 and present the results in Figure 3.3. We consider only medium and long
multi-task batch jobs in this evaluation since they yield more savings because of their
service length. Our result in Figure 3.3(a) shows that, we save 15% of CPU, 24%
of memory, and 20% of the service time on average for medium length jobs. For
long jobs, the savings are much higher– 21% of CPU, 27% of memory, and 24% of
the service time. We notice that, in both cases, the maximum saving is achieved if
prediction and rescheduling are performed at the half time of a job’s service length.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, we addressed the fault-tolerant issue in cloud computing from the
perspective of application failures. We presented a system model which first uses a
failure prediction method and then perform task rescheduling to improve throughput and quality of service in a cloud computing system. Our model can achieve a
high degree of reliability through failure prediction of the running tasks with subsequent failure-aware rescheduling in an efficient and timely manner. Simulation results
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Figure 3.3: Resource savings for multi-task batch (a) medium jobs and (b) long jobs

demonstrate that our model can reduce the failure rate and makespan of tasks and
increase the overall resource utilization.
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Chapter 4

A Secure and Reliable Storage Scheme for Cloud Supporting
Deduplication and Integrity Auditing

In this chapter, we present a cloud storage scheme which simultaneously supports
security, reliability, and deduplication. Our scheme blends convergent encryption
and perfect secret sharing method to achieve confidentiality of data and encryption
keys. It also achieves fault tolerance by dispersing data to multiple storage servers
using Reed-Solomon erasure code. We use Merkle hash tree to authenticate users by
verifying Proof of Ownership (PoW) of data for carrying out secure deduplication.
Both theoretical security analysis and experimental evaluation demonstrate that our
scheme is provably secure and incurs only a small overhead compared to some of the
existing systems.

4.1

Introduction

Traditional cryptographic approaches are not enough to provide security and reliability. A resilient storage scheme must ensure fault-tolerance by dispersing data to
multiple storage servers. Various information dispersal algorithms (IDA) such as,
secret sharing schemes [110, 127, 141] and erasure coding [112] have been proposed
by researchers that often come with high redundancy. The higher the redundancy,
the higher the availability, storage overhead and cost. This gets even worse if multiple instances of the same data are stored at the server end. Hence, deduplication
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is crucial to make efficient use of storage. Traditional encryption and secret sharing
schemes on one hand ensure security, and on the other hand, allow duplication. Different users could generate different ciphertexts from the same plaintext using their
own secret key and this makes deduplication impossible. Storage schemes such as
Cleversafe [117] and DepSky [15] provide security and reliability, however they do
not support deduplication.
The concept of convergent encryption [36] has been proposed to carry out deduplication. Several storage schemes [26,75,77,78] based on convergent encryption have
been proposed by researchers in the last few years. Some of them [77, 78] use a
variant of Rivest’s [119] All-or-Nothing-Transform with Reed-Solomon Coding, where
all blocks of a file are encrypted together to form a data package, and the encryption
key is embedded within the data. This is a strict requirement since unless one obtains
all of the encrypted blocks, one can not access the key to decrypt any of it.
Secure and efficient access control is essential to protect storage servers from adversaries. Several Proof of ownership algorithms [57, 104] have been proposed to
enable authentication and authorization. Nevertheless, they could leak information
about outsourced data and thus are not privacy preserving. So, secure and reliable
convergent key management is another important requirement for a storage server.
Several schemes [75, 134] exist in literature that facilitate block-level deduplication.
However, they incur key management overhead and do not scale well.
Objectives. Our goal is to propose a dispersed storage scheme that simultaneously achieves security, reliability, and storage efficiency. Our scheme supports secure
authorization and access control of outsourced data without revealing any sensitive
information to adversaries.
Contributions. Following are the main contributions in this direction:
• We propose a cloud storage scheme that combines convergent encryption and
perfect secret sharing method to ensure secure dispersal of data and keys re66

spectively.
• Our scheme guarantees availability of outsourced data by dispersing them to
multiple storage servers using Reed-Solomon erasure coding.
• We achieve storage efficiency through secure data deduplication both at file and
block level.
• We use Merkle hash tree data structure to ensure secure authentication and
fine-grained access control of data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we review some
preliminaries and cryptographic primitives along with a few well known security algorithms and protocols. In Section 4.3, we describe our system model. In Section 4.4, we
present our proposed scheme in detail, followed by theoretical performance analysis
and experimental evaluations in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 respectively. We present
some related work in Section 4.7. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 4.8.

4.2

Preliminaries

In this section, we provide a formal definition of the cryptographic primitives that
form the foundation for our storage scheme. We then present a few algorithms and
protocols that we use in our scheme.

4.2.1

Convergent Encryption and Deduplication

In convergent encryption, a user derives a convergent key by computing the hash of
the file content and then encrypts the file with this key using a symmetric key encryption algorithm. We define convergent encryption with the following four primitive
operations:
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1. KeyGenC (F ) → KC : This key generation algorithm takes a file F as input and
outputs the convergent key KC of F ;
2. EncryptC (KC , F ) → C: This encryption algorithm takes the convergent key
KC and file F as input and outputs the ciphertext C ;
3. DecryptC (KC , C) → F: This decryption algorithm takes the convergent key
KC and a ciphertext C , and outputs the original plaintext file F ;
4. authT agGenC (F ) → aT agF : This authentication tag generation algorithm
takes the file F as input and outputs the tag aT agF of F . The tag is generated over the corresponding ciphertext of the file F by using, aT agF =
authT agGenC (C), where C = EncryptC (KC , F );
4.2.2

Merkle Hash Tree

A Merkle tree is a hash-based data structure that allows secure and efficient verification of content in a large file. To construct a Merkle tree, we split a file into blocks,
group the blocks into pairs and hash each pair using a collision-resistant hash function. The hash values are again grouped in pairs and each pair is further hashed; this
process continues until only a single hash value remains. The last lone hash value is
called the Root of the tree [57].
Sibling Path or Audit Path. We denote Merkle tree over a file F by M HTF .
For a leaf node l ∈ M HTF , the sibling path or the audit path of l consists of hash
values of all the sibling nodes of all nodes on the path from l to the Root. The true
power of Merkle tree is when we want to verify the integrity of ith data block of a file.
Given an index i of a leaf l and a sibling path P for l, we can easily compute all the
intermediate hashes to get to the Root.
Proof of Ownership. Proof of ownership (P oW ), is an interactive authentication algorithm run by a verifier (e.g., storage server) and a prover (e.g., user). In
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this chapter, we use Merkle hash tree to implement P oW where, the verifier simply
chooses some number of leaf indices and asks the prover for the corresponding sibling
paths. The prover responds with a sibling path for each one of them, and the verifier
accepts if all these sibling paths are valid.

4.2.3

Information Dispersal Algorithms (IDA)

An information dispersal algorithm is basically a (k, n) threshold scheme where, a
data d is fragmented into n slices of size d/k each in such a way that the original data
can be reconstructed from any k slices [110]. The core of all (k, n) threshold schemes
is essentially a matrix-vector product where, the file to be stored is broken into k
blocks. Then a dispersal or generator matrix G is created consisting of n rows and
k columns. Data dispersal is accomplished by multiplying the k data blocks by this
generator matrix G. The result is an n element vector called coded blocks; and each
element Ci of this vector is stored in a different storage server. The generator matrix
G is constructed in such a way that, any combination of k rows yields an invertible
matrix. Hence, to reconstruct data d, we compute a new k × k matrix M from the
rows of G that correspond to the k available coded blocks. Then, we multiply these k
fragments by the inverse of the matrix M to recover d [110].

4.2.4

Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme

In a perfect secret sharing scheme (PSS), a secret (e.g., an encryption key) is split
and shared among a number of participants so that only a subset of them can be
used to reconstruct the secret, and the remaining subsets get no information about
it. Shamir’s [127] (k, n) threshold scheme is a PSS where, a secret S is divided into n
pieces S1 , S2 , ..., Sn such that: i) knowledge of any k or more of the Si s makes S easily
computable; ii) knowledge of k − 1 or fewer Si s leaves S completely undetermined.
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4.3

System Model

Our proposed system consists of following three entities as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: System Model
Cloud Users. Cloud Users (i.e., group members) are basically staff members of
an organization, who register themselves through the Trusted Server upon system
initialization. They interact with the Storage Server to outsource their data to the
cloud. Depending on the access privilege, any group member is able to perform read,
write, or restore operation as needed. However, we do not address the synchronization
issue in concurrent read-write operations.
Trusted Server. Trusted Server is responsible for system parameter generation,
user registration and revocation. Before a file or a block of a file is outsourced to
cloud, it stores the corresponding file and block authentication tags. At the same
time, it keeps a copy of the Merkle hash tree data structure for each outsourced
file so that later on, it can be used for user authentication. In addidtion, it stores
outsourced data block location– pointers of which Storage Server stores what data.
Cloud Users usually have resource constraints and do not possess the skill or the
expertise to assess data integrity and service reliability of a Storage Server. Hence,
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they employ auditors whose job is to periodically check and ensure that Storage Server
is maintaining integrity of outsourced data. In our design, Trusted Server performs
the role of an auditor.
Storage Server. Storage Servers are managed by cloud service provider (CSP).
Users outsource their data to these servers and utilize their elastic nature without
worrying about local data storage and maintenance. Once an upload operation is
completed, a copy of the Merkle hash tree M HTF data structure with all its hash
values are stored on the Storage Server. This helps the Storage Server to check the
proof of ownership of a file or a block when an unauthorized upload or download
takes place.

4.4

Proposed Storage Scheme

In this section, we present the design of our Secure and Reliable S torage Scheme
that supports client-side data deduplication (SecReS ). We provide a brief overview
of SecReS depicted in Fig 4.2. Then, we present a detailed description of various
modules of SecReS describing their functionalities.

Figure 4.2: Overview of SecReS (Secure and Reliable Storage)
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4.4.1

SecReS Design

SecReS uses convergent encryption which ensures two identical plaintext files always
yield the same ciphertext. This facilitates deduplication and thus increases storage efficiency of servers. To ensure data availability in case of server failures or compromise,
SecReS applies RS-Coding (i.e., Reed-Solomon Erasure Coding) [106] and disperses
encrypted data to multiple storage servers. SecReS administers authentication and
access control of users while uploading or downloading content from remote servers.
Algorithm 4: Data Processing: Process(F )
input : F
output: < Ci∗ , KC∗ i >
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

4.4.2

Kg ← KeyGen();
Kc ← Hash(Kg ||F );
< Bi > ← Fragment(F , k);
C ← Encrpyt(Kc , F );
for each Bi ∈ < Bi > do
Ci ← Encrpyt(Kc , Bi );

. plaintext file
. blocks and key shares
. group key
. convergent key

. encrypted blocks

< Ci∗ > ← RS-Coding(<Ci >, (k,n));
Kc∗ ← Encrypt(Kg ,Kc ) ;
< KC∗ i > ← PSS(Kc∗ ,(k, n));
aT ag F ← authTagGen(C);
for each Ci∗ ∈ < Ci∗ > do
aT ag Ci∗ ← authTagGen (Ci∗ );
M HT F ← constructMHT (< Ci∗ >);
Disperse (< Ci∗ , KC∗ i , aT ag Ci∗ > , aT agF );

. encoded
. n key shares
. file tag
. block tags
. upload request

System Initialization

System initialization phase sets up all the required parameters needed for the scheme
to operate. A convergent encryption scheme with its corresponding primitive functions, namely KeyGenC , EncryptC , and DecryptC are first initialized. The Trusted
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Server in SecReS works like a group manager. All users first register themselves to
the system by initiating a communication with the Trusted Server. Users in the same
group are granted a group key Kg ; this key is then used to generate the convergent
key, Kc (lines 1-2 of Algorithm 4).
4.4.3

Data Processing

Data processing (lines 4-14 of Algorithm 4) consists of the following sequential operations.
Fragmentation and Encryption. Given a plaintext file F , SecReS splits the
file into k equal size blocks: B1 , B1 , ..., Bk (line 3). The file F and the individual
blocks Bi are then encrypted (lines 4-6) using the same convergent key Kc generated
in earlier steps.
Applying Erasure Coding. We apply a systematic Reed-Solomon erasure coding [106] to construct n file shares from the k shares (line 7). In a systematic coding,
the coded blocks contain all elements from the original file blocks. As shown in
Fig 4.3, the first k elements of the coded blocks C are equal to the elements of B.
This implies that the first k rows of the generator matrix G is the k × k identity
matrix.

Figure 4.3: A Systemic Reed-Solomon Erasure Coding [117]

Key Management. Key management process is described in lines 8-9 of Algo73

rithm 4. First, we encrypt the convergent key Kc using the group key Kg . Afterwards, we apply Perfect Secret Sharing technique to generate n shares of Kc . We use
Shamir’s [127] (k, n) threshold scheme where, at least k key-shares are required to
reconstruct Kc .
Tag Generation. We invoke authTagGen to generate authentication tags for
an input file F as well as for all its blocks (lines 10-12 of Algorithm 4). As mentioned earlier, we compute authentication tags on the ciphertexts of the file and its
corresponding blocks. These tags are stored on the Trusted Servers.
Merkle Hash Tree Construction. We construct a Merkle Hash Tree on the n
ciphertext blocks (line 13 of Algorithm 4). We store the M HTF data structure with
all its hash values on the Trusted Server and also on the Storage Server (once upload
is completed). The Storage Server can check the proof of ownership of a file or a
block when an unauthorized upload or download takes place.
Once all the steps up to line 13 of Algorithm 4 are executed, the file F is ready to
be uploaded to the Storage Server. At this point, SecReS invokes Disperse method
by passing two arguments: i) all encrypted data blocks (Ci s) of file F with their
corresponding encrypted key shares (Kc s), and ii) the file authentication tag, aT ag F
(line 14 of Algorithm 4).

4.4.4

Data Dispersal

When a user wants to upload a file F , there can be two scenarios: i) the file is being
uploaded for the first time, or ii) the file has already been uploaded by another user
from the same group.
First Upload. This case is straightforward. As soon as a Storage Server receives
a Disperse (Ci , KCi ) request, it first checks whether the corresponding file authentication tag, aT ag F exists on the server. If no match is found, it then searches for the
authentication tag, aT ag Ci for the block Ci . Since this is the first file upload request,
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no match is found and the block is stored on the server (with the key attached to it).
This process continues until all blocks corresponding to the file F are stored. Once
dispersal of all blocks is completed, Storage Servers return pointers to the stored block
locations to the Trusted Server, which saves these in its local storage. In return, the
Trusted Server also sends a copy of the Merkle hash tree data structure, M HTF to
the Storage Servers. This M HTF later on is used by the servers to authenticate users
when they request for successive read (download) or write (upload) operations.
Algorithm 5: Disperse(< Ci∗ , KC∗ i , aT ag Ci∗ > , aT agF )
input : (< Ci∗ , KC∗ i , aT ag Ci∗ > , aT agF )
output: < Ci∗ , KC∗ i >
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

. blocks and the file tag
. upload new blocks to server

if aT ag F exists on server then
print “duplicate file” ;
if PoW(F ) == TRUE then
return blockPointer(Ci );
else
abort;
else
print “File NOT duplicate” ;
< dupF > ← Duplicate(< Ci∗ >,F );
for i ← 1 to n do
if PoW(Ci∗ ) == TRUE then
if dupF [i] == TRUE then
return blockPointer(Ci∗ );
else
Upload(Ci∗ , KC∗ i , aT ag Ci∗ , aT agF );

. malicious adversary

. new block

else
print “Ignore and Report” ;

Subsequent Uploads (Secure Deduplication). If a file F is already uploaded
by a user, for subsequent upload operations of the same file F , duplicate checking
at the file level (Algorithm 5) is performed. For a different file, duplicate checking
is performed at the block level (Algorithm 6). The reason is simple, this new file
may have some blocks common with the previously uploaded file. Our goal is to
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upload only new blocks, and update pointer references so that prior uploaded blocks
point to the newly uploaded file. The proof of ownership of a file (PoW(F )) or a
block (PoW(Ci )) can be checked by running a challenge-response protocol between
the server and the user. The server first challenges the user by randomly generating p leaf indexes {l1 , l2 , ..., lp }. The user then responds with a set of sibling paths
{si1 , si2 , ..., sik } for each leaf li . Finally, server computes the Root of the tree with the
value computed using the sibling path values and verifies with its stored Root value.

Figure 4.4: Server Verifying Proof of Ownership with Merkle Hash Tree
An example of a Proof of Ownership verification by Storage Server is shown in
Fig 4.4. Storage Server first asks the user to generate the sibling path for the leaf
indexed 4 (i.e., corresponding to block B4 ). The user in response contacts the Trusted
Server, and sends the path, P = {C3 , C1−2 , C5−8 } to the Storage Server. Now, using
the hashes from the path P , Storage Server successively computes the intermediate
node hashes C3−4 and C1−4 to get to the Root, C1−8 . If this computed Root hash
matches the value it had already stored, the proof of ownership of the block, B4 is
proven.
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File-level Deduplication. File-level deduplication is performed by executing
lines 1-6 of Algorithm 5. When a Storage Server gets a file upload request, it first
checks whether the corresponding file authentication tag exists on the server (line 1).
If so, server assumes that it is a duplicate file upload request and hence asks the user
to prove his/her file ownership by invoking PoW(F ) (lines 2-3). If the user passes the
test, server declines the upload operation and returns the pointer to that data block
(line 4). If PoW(F ) fails, that means the user is not authorized to read the file and
hence, server aborts upload operation of the file and exits (lines 5-6).
Algorithm 6: Duplicate Block Detection:
Duplicate(< Ci∗ >,F )
. set of all blocks and the file F
input : < Ci∗ >, F
output: dupF
. logical array of TRUE & FALSE

5

for each Ci∗ ∈ F do
if aT ag Ci∗ exists on server then
set dupF [i] ← TRUE ;
else
set dupF [i] ← FALSE ;

6

return dupF ;

1
2
3
4

Block-level Deduplication. This operation is performed by executing line 7-17
of Algorithm 5. If file authentication tag (of the block to be uploaded) does not exist
on the server, that means it is a new file (line 8). Therefore, block-level duplication
of this file is checked by invoking Duplicate() method from Algorithm 6. In this
algorithm, server creates a one-dimensional array, dupF to store information about
a block’s (of file F ) existence on the server. If the block authentication tag already
exists on the server, it sets the corresponding index in the array to TRUE (lines 2-3).
Otherwise, it is considered as a new block of file F and dupF [i] is set to FALSE in this
case (lines 4-5).
The Duplicate() function of Algorithm 6 returns a Boolean array dupF indicating
which blocks of F are duplicates and which are new (line 6). Now, for each block Ci∗
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of F , server invokes P oW (Ci∗ ). If P oW (Ci∗ ) returns TRUE, server then checks whether
this block has dupF [i] set to TRUE (lines 11-12). If yes, that means it is a duplicate
block and therefore, server denies the block upload operation and returns a pointer
to the block to the user (lines 12-13). If dupF [i] is set to FALSE for the block Ci∗ , it is
considered as a new block of F to be uploaded to the server (lines 14-15). If P oW (Ci∗ )
returns FALSE, that implies the user is not authorized to access this block. Hence,
server ignores the upload request and reports the uploader as a potential adversary
(lines 16-17).

4.4.5

Data Restoration

User first sends the file authentication tag for file F to the server and requests for
downloading F . The server checks the tag with its stored tag and if finds a match,
it asks the user to prove file ownership by invoking P oW (F ). If user passes the test,
pointer to the file (with all block pointers) is returned to the user. User collects k
available blocks to reconstruct the ciphertext, C and the encrypted convergent key
Kc∗ . The key is decrypted using the group key Kg and then the ciphertext C is
decrypted to recover the plaintext file F .

4.5

Security and Performance Analysis

Confidentiality. SecReS uses a combination of convergent encryption and fragmentation (with erasure coding) before outsourcing data to cloud. To decrypt a single
block of data, a malicious adversary has to compromise at least k out of n storage
servers to get the convergent key Kc . This is yet not enough for the adversary since
Kc is encrypted by the group key Kg – which needs to be compromised too to access
Kc .
Authentication and Integrity. SecReS uses Merkle hash tree (MHT) challengeresponse protocol to ensure secure access and integrity of outsourced data. The
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security of these two operations depend mostly on the security of the MHT. The use
of strong collision-resistant hash function in constructing MHT provides the first line
of defense. In addition, the hashes are computed on the content of encrypted data
blocks instead of plaintexts.
Availability and Reliability. Dispersal of data to multiple storage servers with a
judicious choice of k and n can guarantee data availability even if (n − k) out n coded
blocks are compromised or corrupted. Larger (n − k)/n implies higher reliability.
However, it also means more storage overhead and relatively lower security (fewer
storage servers need to be compromised to reconstruct data) [157]. To trade off this,
SecReS uses a systematic (10, 16) Reed-Solomon coding. It improves performance
since the first 10 coded blocks need not be encoded. Similarly, while decoding, coded
blocks that are equal to the original data blocks do not have to be decoded too [117].

4.6

Implementation and Evaluation

We build a prototype of SecReS on a machine that has Intel Xen E5640 quad-core
processor running at 2.66 GHz with 16 GB of memory. We use SHA-256 as our hash
function and AES-256 for encryption. We implement Reed-Solomon coding using
Jerasure [105] and all cryptographic protocols using Crypto++ [33].

Figure 4.5: Encoding, Decoding, and PoW Performance
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We conduct our experiments on a network that has average upload speed of 200
Mbps and download speed of 400 Mbps. For dispersing our data, we apply a systematic (10, 16) Reed-Solomon coding and use 16 storage servers from Amazon S3. We
observe that, fragmentation, encryption (or decryption), and tag generation together
need less than 2% of the total execution time even for a file size of 2 GB. Hence, we
evaluated our system by analyzing its encoding, decoding and PoW protocol performance.
Encoding. We consider file sizes ranging from 32 MB to 2 GB in our experiment
and present the performance in Table 4.1. From Figure 4.5(a), we observe that, for
smaller files between 32 − 256 MB, encoding operation takes about 12% to 16% of
the file upload time. Performance increases as files grow. We notice that, files larger
that 512 MB consume less than 10% of the upload time.
Table 4.1: Execution Time (s) of Operations in SecReS
File Size

Encoding

PoW

Upload

Decoding

Download

32 MB
64 MB
128 MB
256 MB

0.40
0.58
0.84
1.32

0.60
0.91
1.47
2.03

2.38
3.79
6.58
11.05

0.50
0.70
0.98
1.47

1.43
2.02
3.71
6.25

512 MB
1024 MB
2048 MB

2.21
3.70
6.66

3.28
5.82
10.98

22.35
43.64
85.74

2.30
3.77
6.62

11.69
22.06
43.86

Decoding. To measure decoding performance while downloading a file, we consider the worst case scenario and assume that six servers (of any combination) are
unavailable at any given time. From Table 4.1, we see that decoding operation is
slower than the encoding operation for all file sizes. However, like encoding, the performance of decoding operation also improves for larger files (e.g., files larger than 512
MB) and for files larger than 2 GB, decoding accounts for only 15% of the download
time.
PoW Performance. While uploading a file, PoW protocol executes the follow80

ing: i) Merkle tree construction, ii) challenge-response operations (by the user and
the storage server), and iii) protocol message transfer (over the network). We notice
that, to validate 10 sibling paths over a 200 Mbps network, it takes less than a second
and is negligible. That means, the performance of this protocol solely depends on the
tree construction time. Hence, we ignore the PoW protocol execution time in the file
download phase (no Merkle tree construction). From Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5(c), we
observe that, PoW operation takes about 25% to 18% of the upload time for files
smaller than 512 MB. The performance improves for larger files, and it takes about
only 13% of the file upload time for files bigger than 1 GB which is quite acceptable
in practical scenario.

4.7

Comparison with Related Works

Resch et al. [117] propose a storage scheme named AONT-RS that blends Rivest’s
AONT scheme [119] with a systematic Reed-Solomon erasure coding [106]. This
scheme is computationally secure; however, it has several drawbacks. First, it uses
a random key as its encryption key, which makes deduplication impossible. Second,
to reconstruct a file from its ciphertext, one has to obtain all of the blocks. Based
on the AONT-RS scheme, Li et al. propose two storage schemes: i) CAONT-RSRivest [77], and ii) CAONT-RS [78]. To support deduplication, CAONT-RS-Rivest
replaces the random key in AONT-RS with a convergent key (generating hash by
SHA-256). Unlike these schemes, our proposed scheme uses convergent encryption
which facilitates secure deduplication, and ensures both file level and block level
authentication and access control.
Bessani et al. [15] propose DepSky that uses Krawczyk’s [73] secret sharing made
short (SSMS) method. They use i) symmetric encryption for encrypting data, ii) RSCoding for data dispersal, and iii) secret sharing method for key distribution. DepSky
has two major drawbacks. First, to verify integrity of n data blocks, n digests are
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computed (one for each storage server), which is expensive. Second, deduplication
is not possible because of symmetric encryption of files. In contrast, our proposed
scheme uses Merkle hash tree protocol to protect data integrity. Once the tree is
computed on the n blocks of a file F , it only takes log2 n hash operations to verify
integrity of any block.
Symform [134] and Dekey [75] generate n convergent keys for n blocks and these
keys are distributed across multiple key management servers using secret sharing
scheme. Both of them generate a large number of keys and managing these keys is
clearly a overhead. Different from their approach, our scheme generates only one
convergent key for any given file, and both the file and its corresponding blocks are
encrypted using the same key.

4.8

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed SecReS, a secure and reliable dispersed storage scheme.
SecReS ensures confidentiality and reliability by blending convergent encryption with
information dispersal. It uses a per file convergent key; group members who have a
common group key can read or write files they share. Key shares are stored on
multiple servers in encrypted form; hence, there is no key management overhead
at the client end. The use of Merkle hash tree enables SecReS to restrict readwrite operations only to the authorized data owners. Our prototype implementation
of SecReS demonstrates that it incurs only a small overhead running Merkle tree
protocol and executing encoding-decoding operations compared to the overall upload
and download time.
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Chapter 5

An Efficient and Secure Storage Scheme for Cloud by Combining
Convergent Encryption and Access Control Scheme

Convergent encryption scheme has been used over the years for ensuring security and
enabling deduplication in cloud. Nonetheless, this scheme is vulnerable to a sidechannel attack called “confirmation-of-a-file” and its variant “learn-the-remaininginformation” attack which breach user privacy by observing the deduplication operation. To address this issue, we propose a scheme which blends convergent encryption
with a traditional access control scheme for simultaneously achieving confidentiality and deduplication. Both theoretical security analysis and experimental results
show that our scheme is provably secure and resilient against attacks. It incurs minor storage and latency overhead while performing file and block level deduplication.
Furthermore, it ensures secure and fine-grained access control of outsourced data by
efficiently handling key-management process.

5.1

Introduction

Besides offering on-demand storage at an affordable cost, cloud providers must also
ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability, and efficient access control of outsourced
data. We know that conventional cryptosystems [17, 53, 122] are broadly used to
protect data security and privacy; however, they do not support deduplication. In
Chapter 4, we presented a cloud storage scheme that used the notion of convergent
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encryption to address security and deduplication issues. The idea is to generate
identical ciphertext from identical plaintext by leveraging convergent encryption, and
thereby achieve confidentiality and deduplication at the same time.
Some of the existing solutions [12, 71, 84, 108, 132] attempt to provide these two
functionalities; however, they leak users’ private information and are vulnerable to
several side-channel attacks such as “confirmation-of-a-file” attack and “learn-theremaining-information” attack [58]. To combat these attacks, several works [57, 104]
suggested using the concept of “Proof of Ownership (PoW)” – a challenge-response
protocol run both by the server and the client to authenticate each other. These
solutions however, cannot ensure data confidentiality in the presence of a honest-butcurious storage provider. In Chapter 4, we tried to address this issue and proposed
a storage scheme that makes use of the Merkle hash tree data structure for authenticating users. Although it prevents unauthorized adversaries to break into the system,
still this solution leaks sensitive user data while performing deduplication operations
and therefore not fully resilient against attacks.
Objectives. To overcome the inherent limitations of convergent encryption and
reduce the attack vectors associated with it, in this chapter, we present another secure
storage scheme for providing data security and supporting deduplication operation.
Our main goals are to: i) improve attack resilience, ii) offer fine-grained user access
control, iii) ensure anonymity and privacy, and iv) provide secure and simple key
management service.
Contributions. Following are the main contributions in this direction. We also
present the differences here with our previous scheme.
• We generated convergent key by creating a group key Kgr and then mixing it
with the file before applying the hash function. This group key is shared (during
registration phase) only with people who have similar user attributes. Hence,
the attacker must know this key for launching any successful “confirmation-of84

a-file” attack even though he has other useful information.
• In the storage scheme presented in Chapter 4, we used the same file convergent
key to encrypt each of the blocks associated with that file. But, in this scheme
we generate distinct convergent keys for each block and then encrypt them
independently with their respective block convergent keys. Thus, this scheme
further strengthens security.
• Like our previous scheme, we used Reed-Solomon erasure coding to ensure data
availability in case of failures. However, in this scheme, we use Reed-Solomon
encoding (for sensitive data that need extra security) before encryption. This
helps hide the exact size of the original file (and also the individual block size),
and thus substantially reduces the effectiveness of the attack vector for “learnthe-remaining-information” attacks.
• In our previous storage scheme, we used perfect secret sharing scheme where
encryption keys are embedded with data. However, in this scheme, we encrypted
the convergent key using an access control structure. This ensures that, only
users who possess a specific set of attributes that satisfy the access structure will
be able to decrypt the key. Additionally, this also simplifies key management.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we review some
preliminaries and cryptographic primitives along with a few well known security algorithms and access control protocols. In Section 5.3, we describe our system model
and the proposed scheme. In Section 5.4, we present implementation and evaluation
of our scheme, followed by theoretical security analysis in Section 5.5. We present
some related work in Section 5.6. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 5.7.
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5.2

Background

In this section, we first talk about the inherent limitations of convergent encryption
by presenting its vulnerability to some known attacks. We then define an access
structure and state how user attributes are related to this definition to label different
sets of encrypted data.

5.2.1

Why Convergent Encryption is not secure?

Convergent encryption can not always ensure security and suffers from various attacks
that have been discussed in literature [14, 58, 71]. The following two attacks are the
notable ones.
COF (Confirmation-Of-a-File) Attack. In convergent encryption, the encryption key is generated by applying a collision resistant hash function on the plaintext file; then ciphertext is computed using that key via a symmetric encryption
scheme. This deterministic relationship between a plaintext file and a ciphertext
opens the door for the attacker to exploit the system. If an attacker somehow gets
a plaintext file F, it is possible to find the underlying ciphertext C that could be
drawn from a dictionary D = {F1 , F2 , ..., Fn } of size n. The attacker applies offline
brute-force techniques for each i = {1, 2, ..., n} to compute ciphertext Ci for each of
the corresponding plaintext file Fi and checks whether that Ci is already stored in
the server or not. The idea is simple here, the attacker generates different versions
of the ciphertexts and tries to upload them to the server. When a match is found,
server notifies the attacker that it is already stored. Thus, the attacker extracts useful
information and thereby exploits the system.
LRI (Learn-the-Remaining-Information) Attack. In this type of attack, it
is assumed that attacker already knows some information from the file. Therefore,
attacker tries to guess the unknown portion of the file by applying a series of encryption operations until a match is found with a previously observed ciphertext. A
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simple example is a letter from a bank containing a user’s checking or savings account
information. As we know, every bank has a predefined letter template where most
part are common except a few variable ones. If an attacker has enough computational
capacity to beat the entropy of the file (i.e., computationally feasible to extract the
remaining information in finite time), it is possible to launch an attack and thus steal
sensitive user data.

5.2.2

Access Structure

Let {U1 , U2 , ..., Un } be a set of users. A collection A ⊆ P ({U1 , U2 , ..., Un }) where
P ({U1 , U2 , ..., Un }) denotes the power set of {U1 , U2 , ..., Un }, the set of all subsets of
{U1 , U2 , ..., Un }.
A is monotone if ∀X,Y : if X ∈ A and X ⊆ Y then Y ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone
collection) A of non-empty subsets of {U1 , U2 , ..., Un }, i.e., A ⊆ P ({U1 , U2 , ..., Un })
\{∅} [11]. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are
called the unauthorized sets. In our scheme, the access structure A will contain the
authorized sets of user attributes.
Access Control Tree T . Let T be an access control tree representing an access
structure A. Each internal node (i.e., non-leaf) of the tree is a threshold gate (AND or
OR gates), and the leaves are associated with user attributes. As an example, a tree
with “AND” and “OR” gates can be represented by 2 of 2 and 1 of 2 threshold gates
respectively. Let us suppose, np is the number of children of a node p and tp is its
threshold value, then 0 < tp ≤np . Now, when tp = 1, the threshold gate becomes an
OR gate and when tp = np , it turns into an AND gate. Each leaf of T is represented
by an user attribute and a threshold value tp = 1.
Satisfiability of Access Tree T . Any user U will be able to decrypt a ciphertext
C using an encryption key K if and only if there is an assignment of attributes S
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from K to nodes of the access control tree such that the tree is satisfied. Let Tn be
the subtree of T rooted at node n. If a user U possesses a set of attributes β that
satisfies the access control tree Tn , we denote it as Tn (β) = 1. If n is an internal
node, we can compute Tn (β) by recursively evaluating Tc (β) for all children c of
node n. Tn (β) returns 1 if and only if at least tp children return 1. And if n is a leaf
node, Tn (β) returns 1 if and only if the attributes associated with node n is in β.

Figure 5.1: Example of an Access Control Tree and its Satisfiability
In some situations, when a user encrypts sensitive information, it is imperative
that she establishes a specific access control policy on who can access and decrypt
this information. For example, suppose that the FBI public corruption offices in
Lexington and Chicago are investigating an allegation of bribery involving a Chicago
lobbyist and a Kentucky congressman. The head FBI agent may want to encrypt a
sensitive memo so that only personnel that have certain privileges or attributes can
access it [17]. For instance, as depicted in Figure 5.1, the head agent may specify
the following access structure for accessing this information: ((“Public Corruption
Office” AND (“Lexington” OR “Chicago”)) OR Security-Level > 4). Thereby, the
head agent could mean that the memo should only be accessed by agents who work
at the public corruption offices at Lexington or Chicago, and FBI officials very high
up (level greater than 4) in the management chain.
88

5.3

System Model

Users. Users (i.e., group members) are basically staff members of an organization,
who register themselves through the Trusted Server upon system initialization.
Trusted Key Manager. Trusted Key Manager (TKM) is responsible for system
parameter generation, user registration and revocation. Before a file or a block of a
file is outsourced to cloud, it stores the corresponding file and block authentication
tags. It also stores the encryption key for each file and block in ciphertext form. In
addidtion, it maintains a mapping of the outsourced data block location– pointers of
which Storage Server stores what block.
Storage Server. Storage Servers are managed by cloud service provider (CSP).
Users outsource their data to these servers and utilize their elastic nature without
worrying about local data storage and maintenance.

5.3.1

CP-ABCE Operations

Our scheme is a blend of ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption [17] and convergent encryption– we named it Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Convergent Encryption (CP-ABCE). We define CP-ABCE with the following seven fundamental
operations:
1. Registration(U, S) → Kgr : When a new user U wants to register herself to the
system, this algorithm is initiated. It takes the user ID and the set of attributes
she possesses as its inputs and outputs a group key Kgr .
2. KeyGen(Kgr , F ) → KC : This key generation algorithm is basically a strong
collision-resistant hash function. It takes a file F, and a group key Kgr (i.e.,
contains a set of attributes S describing the key) as its inputs and outputs a
convergent key KC .
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3. EncryptF (KC , F ) → CF : This encryption algorithm takes as input a file F, the
convergent key KC and produces a ciphertext CF such that only a user who
possesses KC will be able to decrypt F.
4. EncryptK (Kgr , (KC , A)) → CK : This encryption algorithm takes as input the
convergent key KC , the access structure A, and the group key Kgr . It produces
a ciphertext CK such that only a user who possesses a set of attributes S that
satisfies the access structure A will be able to decrypt CK . We assume that the
ciphertext CK implicitly contains A.
5. DecryptK (Kgr , (CK , A)) → KC : This decryption algorithm takes as input a
ciphertext CK , the access structure A, and the group key Kgr . If a user (having
the group key Kgr ) who possesses a set of attributes S could satisfy the access
structure A then the algorithm decrypts the ciphertext CK and recovers the
convergent key KC .
6. DecryptF (KC , CF ) → F: This decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext
CF and a convergent key KC , The algorithm decrypts the ciphertext CF and
returns the plaintext file F.
7. T agGen(F ) → aT agF : This authentication tag generation algorithm takes a file
F as input and outputs the tag aT agF . This tag is generated over the ciphertext
of the file F by using, aT agF = T agGen(CF ), where CF = EncryptF (F, KC ).
5.3.2

Our Construction

In this section, we describe the two main operations of our scheme: data archival and
retrieval. We use the notations shown in Table 5.1 to present our algorithm.
Data Archival Algorithm. This algorithm consists of the following sequential
operations (Algorithm 7). When a user Ui wants to upload a file F , she needs to
register herself to the system. The Trusted Key Manager (TKM) in our scheme
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works like a group key manager. All users first register themselves to the system by
initiating a communication with the TKM. Users in the same group are granted a
group key Kgr ; this key is then used to generate the convergent key, KC by using a
one way hash function on the file content F (lines 1-2 of Algorithm 7).
Table 5.1: Notations.
Notation
Ui
Si
T KM
SP
F
Kgr
KC
Ai
Bi
Pi
Ci
Ki
CKi
H
aT agF
aT agBi

Description
Cloud User i
Attributes of Ui
Trusted Key Manager
Storage Server
Plaintext File
A Group Key shared among group members
Convergent Key for file F
Access Structure for Ui
ith Data Block
Pointer to the ith data block
Ciphertext corresponding to the block Bi
Convergent key of block Bi
Encrypted Convergent Key of block Bi
Hash Function
Authentication tag of file F
Authentication tag of block Bi

Once convergent key KC is generated, the next step is to encrypt file F to produce
ciphertext CF (line 3). In line 4, the algorithm computes an authentication tag of
the file, it is computed on the ciphertext though. Now, the convergent key KC is
encrypted by invoking the Encrypt operation (line 5). While encrypting KC with
Kgr , it specifies the access structure A, so that only users whose attributes S satisfy
this access structure can recover the key. When user Ui makes a file upload request
to the TKM, it first checks whether the file authentication tag already exists. If yes,
it considers that as a duplicate file (lines 6-7) and returns all ciphertext blocks along
with their corresponding encryption keys and the location of the blocks (i.e., pointers)
on the server (line 8).
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If the file F that the user Ui tries to upload is a new file, Algorithm 7 performs
operations specified in lines 12-23. TKM first splits F into K blocks (line 10), and
then applies Reed-Solomon erasure coding [106] to make it n blocks (line 11). This
encoding is optional, we can apply it for sensitive data. It helps not to divulge the
actual size of the data, and also helps combat against “confirmation-of-a-file” attack
that we described in Section 5.2.1.
In lines 12-14, TKM generates convergent key for each of the n blocks and produces the corresponding ciphertexts for each block by encrypting with this key. Once
all blocks are encrypted, user Ui (data owner) further encrypts each block key by
specifying the access structure (lines 15-16). As mentioned before, only users whose
group keys (i.e., containing attributes S) satisfy this access structure would be able
to decrypt and extract the encryption key. In line 17, the algorithm generates authentication tags for all these blocks, then checks for duplicate (lines 18-19) before
uploading to the server. If a block is duplicate, it does not need to be uploaded
again. Hence, TKM returns necessary access information to the user Ui (line 20). For
non-duplicate blocks, TKM uploads those to storage servers (line 22), and stores a
copy of these information (line 23) in its local storage as shown in Table 5.2.
Data Retrieval Algorithm. The sequential operations of data retrieval are
presented in Algorithm 8. When a user Ui wants to download a file F from the
server, it sends a data restoration request to the server through TKM. TKM first
looks into its metadata table (similar to Table 5.2) to find the existence of the file
(lines 1-3 and lines 10-11). If F is found, TKM requests the storage server to download
F . In return, server sends TKM the encrypted blocks with its keys which are also in
encrypted form (line 4). User Ui will be able to decrypt the block encryption keys only
if its key (i.e., group key) contains the attributes Si that satisfy the access structure
specified in the ciphertext of the block encryption keys. If Ui succeeds in extracting
the block encryption keys (line 6), it can decrypt the corresponding blocks (line 7). If
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Algorithm 7: Data Store: Upload(F )
input : F
output: ({Ci }, {CKi }, {Pi })
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Kgr ← Register(Ui , Si )
KC ← H(F ||Kgr )
CF ← Encrpyt(KC ,F )
aT ag F ← TagGen(CF )
CK ← Encrypt(Kgr ,(KC ,A))
if aT ag F exists on server then
print “duplicate file”
return({Ci },{CKi },{Pi })
else
{Bi } ← Split(F , k)
{Bi } ← Encode({Bi },k,n)
for i ← 1 to n do
Ki ← H(Bi ||Kgr )
Ci ← Encrpyt(Ki ,Bi )
{Ai } ← AccessStruct(Ki )
CKi ← Encrypt(Kgr ,(Ki ,Ai ))
aT ag Bi ← TagGen (Ci )
if aT agBi exists on server then
print “duplicate block”
return(Ci ,CKi ,Pi )
else
Upload(Ci ,Pi ,aT agBi ,aT agF )
Store(aT agF ,aT agBi ,CKi ,Ai ,Pi )
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. plaintext file
. group key
. file convergent key
. cipher of F
. file tag
. encrypted file key

. split F into k blocks

. block convergent key
. encrypted blocks
. define access structure
. encrypted block keys
. block tags

erasure coding is used, Ui recovers the original k blocks by decoding operation (line
8). Finally, all K blocks are assembled in line 9 to produce the original plaintext file
F.
Algorithm 8: Data Restore: Download(F )
input : (Ui , F )
output: F or {Bi }
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

. User ID and File F
. plaintext file or blocks

aT agF ← LookUp(F )
if aT ag F exists on server then
print “file found”
return({Ci },{CKi },{Pi })
for i ← 1 to n do
Ki ← Decrypt(Si ,CK )
Bi ← Decrypt(Ki ,Ci )
{Bi } ← Decode({Bi },n,k)
F ← Assemble({Bi },k)
else
print “file not found”

Table 5.2: Trusted Key manager
FileID
4*XXXX

5.4

FileTag
4*YYYY

BlockTag
aT agB1
aT agB2
...
aT agBn

Key
CK 1
CK 2
...
CK n

Access Structure
A1
A2
...
An

Pointers
P1
P2
...
Pn

Implementation and Evaluation

We build a prototype of our system on a machine that has Intel Xen E5640 quadcore processor running at 2.66 GHz with 16 GB of memory. We use SHA-256 as our
hash function and AES-256 for symmetric encryption. We implement Reed-Solomon
coding using Jerasure and all cryptographic protocols using Crypto++ [33]. We
conduct our experiments on a network that has average upload speed of 200 Mbps and
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download speed of 400 Mbps. For dispersing our data, we apply a systematic (10, 16)
Reed-Solomon coding and use 16 storage servers from Amazon S3. To implement
access control structures for encryption keys, we use a convenient set of tools called
cpabe package [16], which has been made available on the web under the GPL.
We observe that, fragmentation, file or block encryption (or decryption), and tag
generation together need less than 3% of the total execution time even for a file size
of 256 MB. Hence, we evaluated our system by analyzing its encoding, decoding and
Key management protocol performance.
Table 5.3: Execution Time (s) of Operations During Upload
File Size
16 MB
32 MB
64 MB
128 MB
256 MB

5.4.1

Encoding
0.24
0.31
0.47
0.72
0.91

Key Management
0.40
0.51
0.62
0.75
0.92

Upload
1.75
2.41
3.65
6.49
10.85

Encoding vs Upload Time

We calculate encoding time taking into account the following operations: i) fragmentation, ii) erasure coding, and iii) encryption. We consider file sizes ranging from 16
MB to 256 MB in our experiment and present the performance in Table 5.3. From
Figure 5.2, we observe that, for smaller files between 16 − 64 MB, encoding operation
takes about 11% to 14% of the file upload time. Performance increases as files grow.
We notice that files equal to or larger that 256 MB consume around 9% of the upload
time.

5.4.2

Decoding vs Download

We calculate decoding time taking into account following operations: i) decryption,
ii) decoding, and iii) defragmentation. From Table 5.4, we see that decoding performs
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Figure 5.2: Encoding Vs Upload Time
slightly slower than the encoding operation for all file sizes. However, like encoding,
the performance of decoding also improves for larger files and for files greater than
or equal to 256 MB, decoding accounts for only 15% of the download time.
Table 5.4: Execution Time (s) of Operations During Download
File Size
16 MB
32 MB
64 MB
128 MB
256 MB

5.4.3

Decoding
0.26
0.34
0.50
0.79
0.94

Key Management
0.40
0.51
0.62
0.75
0.92

Download
1.58
2.23
3.37
4.26
6.18

Metadata Management Overhead

For upload operation, we calculate overhead considering encoding and key management time. And we consider decoding and key management time in case of download
operation.
Figure 5.4 shows the overhead in percentage considering different file sizes for both
upload and download operations. It is evident that, for smaller files between 16 − 64
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Figure 5.3: Decoding Vs Download Time
MB, overhead accounts for 30 − 40%. However, as file size grows, overhead decreases
and for file size of 1 GB or more, overhead accounts for less than 10% of the upload
or download time.

Figure 5.4: Metadata Management Overhead

5.5

Security Analysis

Confidentiality. Our scheme uses a combination of convergent encryption and fragmentation (with erasure coding) before outsourcing data to cloud. The use of sym97

metric key cryptography for encrypting both data and the key ensures higher level of
security.
Attack Resilience. We generated convergent key by creating a group key Kgr
and then mixing it with the file F before applying the hash function. This group key
is shared only with people who have similar user attributes. Hence, the attacker must
know this key for launching any successful “confirmation-of-a-file” attack. Furthermore, we propose to use Reed-Solomon erasure encoding (for sensitive data that need
extra security) in our scheme before encryption. This can help hide the exact size
of the original file, and thus can substantially reduce the effectiveness of the attack
vector for “learn-the-remaining-information” attacks.
Authentication and Access Control. To further strengthen the security of
data, we encrypted the convergent key using an access control structure in our scheme.
This ensures that, only users who possess a specific set of attributes that satisfy the
access structure will be able to decrypt the key.
Availability and Reliability. Dispersal of data to multiple storage servers with
a judicious choice of k and n can guarantee data availability even if (n−k) out n coded
blocks are compromised or corrupted. Larger (n − k)/n implies higher reliability.

5.6

Related Works

Traditional encryption schemes [17,22,53,122] provide confidentiality and fine-grained
access control of outsourced data. Although these solutions are robust from security
perspective, they prevent storage service provider from applying storage efficiency
functions, such as compression and deduplication [132]. Hence, ensuring confidentiality and deduplication simultaneously is an important research topic. Bellare et
al. [14] introduced the idea of message-locked encryption (MLE) to solve this issue.
MLE offers confidentiality only for unpredictable messages, thus fails to ensure semantic security. Another scheme named ClouDedup has been proposed by Puzio
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et al. [108] that employs additional independent servers for performing encryption
and decryption operation. However, this scheme is vulnerable to online brute-force
attack– a compromised active server can guess about an uploaded file by checking if
deduplication occurs or not.
To prevent both offline and online brute-force attack, Keelveedhi et al. proposed
DupLESS [71]. DupLESS is semantically secure as long as the key server is not
compromised. However, DupLESS cannot provide fine-grained access control in a
flexible way. Bellare et al. [13] proposed another relevant scheme name iMLE which
adopts an extensive form of fully homomorphic encryption. It is purely theoretical,
hence not suitable for practical implementation. Felipe et al. presented a scheme
called HEDup [41] that allows deduplication of encrypted data with the aid of a key
server deployed at the cloud service provider premises. Since cloud service provider
has access to encryption keys, it might cause security breach and there is a possibility
of sensitive data disclosure.
Stanek et al. [132] proposed another line of work that first introduced the idea of
popular and unpopular files in a storage system. This scheme suffers from a significant
storage and bandwidth overhead. PerfectDedup [109] made an effort to overcome the
shortcomings of this scheme. Compared to [132], PerfectDedup significantly reduces
the storage and communication overhead. Stanek et al. [131] proposed another solution where they use threshold encryption to encrypt an already encrypted MLE
ciphertext. Although this scheme provides higher security for unpopular files, it increase the computational overhead.

5.7

Summary

In this chapter, we presented a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Convergent Encryption (CP-ABCE) scheme to ensure confidentiality and deduplication of outsourced data to cloud. The convergent encryption guarantees that only a single
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copy of data is stored at the server, and thus reduces the amount of data needed to
be transferred, stored, and managed by storage provider. In our scheme, users’ keys
are specified by a set of attributes while the entity encrypting the data can specify an
access control policy over these attributes so that only a specific set of users are able
to decrypt. We provided an implementation of our system, and analysis shows that
our system can handle data archival and retrieval in a secure and efficient manner.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion and Future Work

The main challenge in storing data at untrusted cloud servers is to frequently, efficiently, and securely verify that the storage provider is maintaining the confidentiality
and the integrity of data. In addition, cloud servers are also susceptible to failures
and performance degradation. Large-scale cloud storage systems can experience various hardware, software, and node failures which can result in permanent data loss as
well as financial disaster. In this dissertation, we addressed some of these issues and
also presented some solution approaches. Next, we summarize the results presented
in this dissertation and also discuss our future work.

6.1

Dissertation Summary

First, we conducted a failure characterization study on the Google cluster dataset
to find out the relevant attributes of a task or a job that may contribute to their
failures. Then we presented our failure prediction model leveraging a special type
of recurrent neural network. Our model takes resource usage measurements data
for each job and task, and predicts the termination status of them (e.g., fail, finish,
etc.). We evaluated our prediction model and found that it can detect task failures
and job failures with an accuracy of 87% and 81% respectively. We also compare
our predictor’s performance with two other machine learning methods (e.g., SVM
and FNN). We observed that, our predictor achieves the most stable performance in
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terms of accuracy, precision, and recall. Finally, we simulated a selected set of jobs
and tasks in a distributed cloud simulator named GloudSim [34]. We used 10-fold
cross validation and make failure prediction at the job level at three different time
slots (i.e., quarter, half, and three-quarter of the job’s running time). Our analysis
reveals that, even if we resubmit/restart the “predicted to be failed” jobs, we may
save a significant amount of system resources (i.e., CPU, memory, and service time).
Second, we presented a fault-tolerant cloud scheduler combining our previously
proposed failure prediction model with a task scheduling algorithm. Our task scheduler ensures: i) failure-aware reliable scheduling: takes into account the failure probability of a task and places them in proper nodes in a timely manner; ii) efficient
resource utilization: dynamically adapts to the resource needs and balances load
through out the network; iii) maximum throughput: a failure-prone task is migrated
only when transferring it to the new node helps in improving task completion time.
We emulated a number of jobs from our Google cluster dataset in the GloudSim [34],
measured performance of our scheduler, and computed related resource savings. Our
predictor first predicts the failure probability of a task or a job, then our scheduler
dynamically adjusts its scheduling decisions based on that prediction. Experimental
results indicate that, if a task or a job’s termination status is correctly predicted, our
scheduler can optimize resource utilization, reduce failure rate and minimize job execution time substantially. Additionally, the early prediction and dynamic rescheduling
can reduce a significant wastage of system resources too.
Third, we presented a secure and reliable storage scheme for cloud that also supports data deduplication. Our scheme uses convergent encryption with perfect secret
sharing method to ensure secure dispersal of data and encryption keys. To ensure
secure authorization and access control of outsourced data to the cloud, this scheme
uses a Proof of Ownership (PoW) protocol using Merkle hash tree data structure.
Our scheme achieves fault tolerance by dispersing both data and encryption keys to
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multiple storage servers using a systematic Reed-Solomon erasure coding. We also
proposed two data deduplication algorithms supporting both file level and block level
deduplication; thus achieving storage efficiency. We implemented a prototype storage
scheme and conducted some experiments on it. Our evaluations demonstrate that
our scheme is provably secure and incurs only a small overhead.
Fourth, to overcome the inherent limitations of convergent encryption and reduce the attack vectors associated with it, we presented another storage scheme for
cloud. Convergent encryption generates identical ciphertext for identical plaintext
since the encryption key is derived by computing a hash of the plaintext itself, and
thereby achieves confidentiality and supports deduplication at the same time. Some
of the existing solutions that use convergent encryption, however, leak users’ private information and are vulnerable to two well known side channel attacks, namely,
“confirmation of a file attack”, and “learn the remaining information attack”. In our
proposed scheme, we tried to combat these attacks by using convergent encryption
with an attribute-based access control structure. Unlike our previous scheme, we use
Reed-Solomon erasure coding before the encryption operation, which guarantees that
the exact size of a file is hidden from adversaries and thus reduces the attack vector
further. The use of ciphertext policy attribute-based access structure in our scheme
ensures secure user authentication and also enables fine-grained access control of both
data and encryption keys. Theoretical security analysis and experimental evaluations
indicate that, our scheme is provably secure, resilient against attacks, and can handle
data store and restore in a secure and efficient manner.

6.2

Future Work

In this dissertation, we presented efficient methods for achieving fault tolerance and
security in cloud computing systems. In the future, we will continue our research in
the following directions.
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6.2.1

Enhancing Our Fault-tolerant Cloud Scheduler

Our cloud scheduler and the failure prediction model are based on the Google trace
dataset– a Google release of scheduler request and utilization data across a large
(12.5K+) general-purpose compute cluster over 29 days. Therefore, our experimental
evaluations might not be generalizable to other cloud infrastructures. Hence, we plan
to extend the prediction model to general cloud clusters beyond the Google cluster.
Moreover, we believe that there is a substantial opportunity for new approaches to
scheduling (e.g., failure-aware and energy-aware resource scheduling) that explicitly
address the increasing challenges of intra-cluster workload heterogeneity and platform
heterogeneity.

Extending the Prediction Model.
Google dataset that we used in our simulation is both incomplete and anonymized
(out of privacy concerns). In particular, it has the following limitations. Firstly, a job
can fail either because of performance reasons (e.g., lack of resources) or reliability reasons (hardware/software/network failures) or simply for testing/debugging purposes.
The traces do not have enough information to determine the causes of job failure
accurately. Secondly, the dataset does not have program or application information,
such as whether the programs are MapReduce jobs. It does not have any information about the job schedulers, or other software running on the nodes. Thirdly, the
resource consumption is normalized by the corresponding maximum values, and the
raw values are not provided. Hence, we cannot fully understand the reasons behind
why certain consumption patterns are correlated with failures. To mitigate the above
drawbacks, we need more information about the traces, but unfortunately, this is not
publicly available. We have assumed that resource conservation is a desired goal for
the users of the cluster. However, this need not be the case as the cluster may be used
purely for debugging or testing tasks, where job failures are the expected behaviour.
104

As such, this drawback can be mitigated if we knew what the cluster is used for,
but this is not the case. We focus our study solely on the Google cluster, and hence
may not be generalizable to other cloud infrastructures. One way to mitigate this is
to study other cloud infrastructure failures. However, there is no publicly available
failure data from real-world cloud deployments on the same scale as the Google cluster, to our knowledge. Nevertheless, we plan to evaluate the predictor on other cloud
clusters (e.g., the cloud trace from IBM research and HPC system) and see how it
performs.

Fine-tuning the Predictor.
There are few issues that need to be resolved to improve the performance of our
predictor. Firstly, we plan to fine-tune the accuracy of the failure prediction model
for better cloud utilization and reliability. One solution could be expanding the set
of features in the training module. Although we select the features that enlarge the
differences between different jobs (fail, finish, etc.) in an attempt to improve the
accuracy, we will explore using deep LSTM structure to generate more and better
features for prediction. When selecting the model we choose to predict at the half
times so that we can save maximum resources. The selection of predicting time is
not proved optimal, but the solution is empirically good. In our experiment, True
Positive Rate (TPR) ranges from 0.70 to 0.88, while False Positive Rate (FPR) ranges
from 0.12 to 0.24. A lower rate of false positives could help the proactive failure
management become more effective and less controversial. Secondly, we perform
offline failure prediction in this work since we already have the Google trace data to
use. Our simulation results are obtained running on a single machine, and it could be
made faster using more cloud resources if deployed on the production cloud. We plan
to deploy our prediction model online and assess its performance overhead. Lastly,
we do not use the entire dataset. Only part of the long and medium length batch
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jobs are selected for evaluating relative resource savings since they consume majority
of resources. However, some production jobs (e.g., critical web services) are supposed
to keep running and do not finish, and thus there are no point in judging if such
a job will successfully finish. In this situation, the job prediction method can not
be directly applied for validation. In our future work, we will address this issue by
handling the heterogeneity of workloads in a more efficient manner while applying
our prediction model.

Energy-efficient Scheduling.
Data centers hosting cloud applications consume huge amounts of electrical energy,
contributing to high operational costs and carbon footprints to the environment.
Therefore, we need green cloud computing solutions that can not only minimize operational costs but also reduce the environmental impact. However, reducing the
power consumption can lead to Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations. Existing
energy-efficient resource allocation algorithms [81, 165] only focus on minimizing energy consumption or their costs, and do not consider dynamic service requirements
of consumers that can change on demand in cloud computing environments. They do
not emphasize on autonomic energy-aware scheduling schemes and policies exploiting
virtual machine resource allocation. Our goal is to develop a dynamic resource provisioning and allocation algorithm that considers the synergy between various data
center infrastructures (i.e., hardware, software, power and cooling units), and improve
energy efficiency and performance, while maximizing the rate of completed jobs by
ensuring reliable and highly available computing environments.

6.2.2

Advancing to a Secure and Robust Cloud Storage Architecture

Cloud computing appears to be a promising platform for small start up companies
and individuals who cannot afford to support and maintain their own computer infras106

tructure. Although regarded as a promising service platform, this model is susceptible
to a variety of threats and vulnerabilities. Ensuring security, integrity and privacy
of data stored in the cloud are the major challenges facing cloud service providers.
Although a lot of work has been done in this area, a wide range of internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities still remain. Ensuring proper identity and
access management policies within an organization is another critical issue. There are
other challenging issues such as resource isolation in virtualized environment, secure
provenance of data, assured data deletion, secure data sharing, etc., which are hindering the widespread deployment of cloud computing. Following are some of the open
issues that need to be resolved for its successful growth and widespread adoption in
the future.

Secure Resource Sharing in a Virtualized Environment.
A significant amount of research [32,87,89,121,125] has been done to secure virtualized
environment. However, resource sharing in a multitenant environment still remains
one of the most critical issues. Existing solutions which aim to achieve resource
isolation tackle the issue from one side and at a given layer (e.g., cache isolation,
cache partitioning, obfuscating time sources, etc.), and thus cannot ensure end-toend security. Furthermore, how to ensure absolute security of hypervisor and virtual
machines is still an open question. Researchers have demonstrated that, by launching
an access-driven side-channel attack, a malicious virtual machine can extract finegrained information (e.g, encryption key) from a victim VM running on the same
physical machine and this is possible in most of the modern virtualized servers [5,166].
Therefore, efficient and robust security models are needed to ensure strong isolation,
mediated sharing, and secure communication between virtual machines.
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Sustainable Identity and Access Management.
Researchers proposed various encryption schemes [18,53,74,155,160] over the years to
address identity and access management issues. Unfortunately, no single monolithic
solution that resolves all these problems exists. Most of these schemes use centralized
access control, therefore prone to single point of failure. Some of these have shortcomings in key management and mutual authentication, especially in hybrid cloud.
These inefficiencies in identity and access management expose a cloud client to significant security and privacy risks. Therefore, establishing a sustainable identity and
access management remains a critical challenge.

Dynamic Integrity Auditing.
Ensuring remote data integrity in cloud computing environment is a difficult task,
especially when data is frequently updated by the client through block modification,
insertion, and deletion. Most of the existing work on remote integrity checking focus on static archival data and therefore cannot be applied to cases where dynamic
data updates are more common [156]. Furthermore, direct extension of the current
Provable Data Possession (PDP) or Proof of Retrievability (PoR) techniques that
can support data dynamics may lead to security loopholes [148]. Therefore, an efficient and provably secure dynamic auditing protocol is highly desirable in cloud
environment to verify the integrity of the data.

Secure Data Provenance.
Data provenance security in cloud computing is an another area of significant concern
that deserves careful attention. The provenance of sensitive data may divulge critical private information, and adversaries always look for security loopholes to exploit
this [7]. Data provenance could be valuable in cases where information trace-back,
auditing, forensic analysis, and history-based access control is needed. Revealing data
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provenance on the contrary can impact data privacy and maintaining a balance between these two is considered a major challenge [135]. Hence, in addition to protecting
integrity of the sensitive data, it is essential to make data provenance secure.

Assured Data Deletion.
In public cloud environment, complete deletion of data (upon request from the client)
including all the log files and backup replicas made for recovery is a fundamental
obligation [52]. But, timely destruction of data might be challenging since multiple
replicas of the data could be present in different geographical locations. Therefore, it
is difficult to ensure that the service provider is reliably removing all backup copies
of the data [136]. Moreover, the disk that needs to be destroyed may also share
data from other clients [24]. Sometimes destroying the storage media itself can be a
necessity to ensure complete deletion of data. If they cannot be disposed properly,
it might be possible to reconstruct data from those abandoned media [64]. Several
solution schemes [48, 111, 136] have been proposed by researchers to resolve the
issue. Although they claim to achieve fine-grained assured deletion, they suffer from
performance overhead and scalability.
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